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INTRODUCTION TO THE FIRST ISSUE
Ambassador Roger G. Harrison, Ph.D.
Ambassador Roger G. Harrison is Director of the Center for Space and Defense Studies

This journal has come into existence to provide a
forum for discussion of an intellectual and policy
foundation for U.S. activities in space. It is open
to all legitimate points of view and to
contributions from policy makers, operators,
academics, and the private sector. Although the
Center for Space and Defense Policy is located at
the Air Force Academy, no preference will be
given in these pages to the Air Force’s position
on space policy. We are not advocates but
academics, and conceive our contribution as
providing Air Force and government leaders with
situational awareness about thinking in other
sectors of the space community, as well as in
other spacefaring nations.
There have been three great visions of America’s
role in space and each can be associated with the
President who emphasized that vision:
Eisenhower’s conception of peaceful uses of
space that focused on the collection of
intelligence data, Kennedy’s call to manned space
exploration, and Reagan’s reconceptualization of
the strategic role of space known as the Strategic
Defense Initiative. All were products, to some
degree, of the competition of the Cold War. All
served as organizing principles that rallied public
support on the one hand, and rationalized
government space programs on the other. And all
were honed during long periods of intellectual
incubation in free and open discussions like those
this journal is intended to propagate.
But it has been twenty-three years since Reagan
espoused his vision and since then the Cold War
ended, new spacefaring actors have emerged, and
both the geopolitical importance of space and the

number of actors increasingly reliant upon it have
expanded many fold. Technology now makes
possible activities that were difficult to imagine in
1983, although perhaps not yet the impenetrable
anti-ballistic missile shield that President Reagan
foresaw. Despite these changes – or, perhaps,
because of them – no vision of space future has
arisen to give coherence to our space activities,
and to rally the sort of public support needed for
the multi-year funding such activities require.
There are, of course, some areas of general
agreement. All agree that circumterrestrial space
is becoming more crowded, and that this trend
will likely accelerate. All agree that in some
areas – and particularly in communications,
positioning, navigation and timing, and
intelligence gathering – space provides
considerable comparative advantages. All agree
that space is a potential arena for military
competition, and that such competition – if it
occurs – will be extraordinarily expensive. And
most would agree that the days of practically
unlimited resources for space are over, that
private investment will now be more selective,
and that future government space programs will
be competing for pieces of a budgetary pie which
is unlikely to grow and might very well shrink.
But there are also areas of broad disagreement, or
perhaps lack of clarity. For example, although
there remains broad public support for the notion
of manned space flight, the sort of enthusiasm
which once made possible the extraordinary
financial and technological effort to land a man
on the Moon is no longer as much in evidence.
Nor has the President’s Vision for Space
iii

Exploration been comprehensively integrated into
a wider vision of the U.S. role in space, and
without such context, it may well prove more
difficult to build and sustain public support.

intellectual debate. Fostering that debate is the
mission the Center for Space and Defense
Studies, through its textbook, this journal, and
its other activities, has set for itself.

By the same token, while there is an emphasis in
U.S. national space policy on maintaining
freedom of action in space, there is no consensus
on what that aspiration implies, or what – in
terms
either
of
there is an hardware or policy –
emphasis in U.S. will be necessary to
achieve it. Some see
national space a forceful assertion of
policy on freedom U.S. military power
of action but no in space as necessary,
think
it
consensus on what some
that implies unavoidable, while
others view it as
counterproductive.
Finally, while most agree – with greater or lesser
enthusiasm – that some regime of regulation will
be necessary in space beyond the rudimentary
ones that now exist, there is disagreement on
whether the United States should retain a special
status within this regime, especially in the
military sector. Some argue that our insistence on
maintaining freedom of action in the military
realm dooms the possibility of imposing order on
the competition of spacefaring nations; others
contend that no such order is possible without the
enforcement of law that only the United States –
with freedom to act as it deems necessary – can
guarantee.
It is not the business of journals but of national
leaders to rally the nation for the challenge of
space, to set priorities and to settle bureaucratic
disagreements. Indeed, if America succeeds in
establishing an intellectual vision for the next
stage of its activities in space, it will doubtless be
a product of a President’s vision and persistence,
as our last three concerted efforts in space have
been. The foundation for taking the next steps in
space will be improved by vetting these steps
through the process of open and honest
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AN INCHOATE PROCESS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF
MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN SPACE
Baker Spring
Baker Spring is the F.M. Kirby Fellow in National Security Policy at the Heritage Foundation,
Washington, D.C.

As the breadth and depth of military activities in
space expand, demands are growing to regulate
these activities at the international level. In some
cases, these demands stem from the recognition
that broader national security operations in space
are moving away from a legacy of being
dominated by secret intelligence activities and in
the direction of more open military activities.1 In
other cases, they are driven by the efforts of arms
control advocates to roll back the “weaponization
of space.”2
Regardless of the underlying
motivations, the demands for international
regulation are going to grow, and the debate will
turn increasingly to the matter of how to proceed.
Recognizing that a limited number of
international agreements to regulate both civilian
1

The Eisenhower Administration initiated U.S. national
security operations in space with a preference for
intelligence activities with the signing of NSC 5520 on 20
May 1955. For a history of these early policies, see Walter
A. McDougall, The Heavens and the Earth: A Political
History of the Space Age (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1997). For the text of NSC 5520 and
related documents, see John M. Logsdon, ed., Exploring the
Unknown, vol. 1, Organizing for Exploration (Washington,
D.C.: NASA SP-4407); John M. Logsdon, ed., Exploring
the Unknown, vol. 2, External Relationships (Washington,
D.C.: NASA SP-4407, 1996); and Stephanie Feyock,
compiler, National Security Space Project, Presidential
Decisions Documents (Washington, D.C.: George C.
Marshall Institute, 2006), pp. 1–20.
2
Michael Krepon (with Christopher Clary), Space
Assurance or Space Dominance? The Case Against
Weaponizing Space (Washington, D.C.: Henry L. Stimson
Center, 2003).

and military activities in space already exist, there
are a number of options available to U.S. and
foreign policy makers.3 A brief survey of these
options was made available to the public by the
Institute of Air and Space Law at McGill
University in Montreal, Canada, in 2005.4 This
survey serves as a good guide to the available
options and as a starting point for assessing the
strength and weaknesses of each one, particularly
at the international level.5
3

Among the existing international agreements are the (1)
Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in
the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the
Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, of 1967; (2) Agreement
on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and
the Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space of 1968;
(3) Convention on International Liability for Damage
Caused by Space Objects of 1972; (4) Convention on
Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space of 1975;
(5) Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the
Moon and Other Celestial Bodies of 1979; and (6) Treaty
Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests in the Atmosphere, in
Outer Space and Under Water of 1963. As a result, there is
also a rich body of international law related to activities in
space. A source of this body of law, although by no means
the only one, is the Legal Subcommittee of the United
Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space
(COPUOS). The records of the Legal Subcommittee are
available at: UNOOSA Legal Subcommittee.
4
“Policy and Legislative Options for Parliamentarians
Regarding Possible Deployment of Further Military
Capabilities in Outer Space,” (Montreal: McGill University,
Institute of Air and Space, Faculty of Law, June 2005).
5
The McGill University study includes options for
purely domestic laws and regulations. This article will
focus on the options available for the international
regulation of military activities in space and touch on U.S.
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The weakness of the McGill University study is
that it treats the options discretely and not in the
context of a broader international political
process. This is not to say that the study implies
that one of the options may be pursued only at the
expense of the others, but that it does not describe
an inchoate process by which the unilateral
actions and non-actions of individual states result
in a form of common law.6 The results of this
inchoate process may evolve into formal
agreements, depending on circumstances.
In fact, much of what passes for the practical
international regulation of military space
activities today has emerged from an inchoate
process.
The formal agreements are less
important in influencing the conduct of military
activities in space. For example, nations have
chosen not to take military actions against
satellites flying over their territories in times of
peace, although they certainly do so against
military aircraft that penetrate their airspace
without authorization. As a result, nations treat
territorial airspace in military terms in a way that
is fundamentally different from how they treat
outer space, even though there is no formal
international agreement that distinguishes
between the two.7 This critical distinction, while
broadly accepted by states today, resulted from a
process utterly lacking in formality and order. It
stemmed from nothing more than emerging
patterns of behavior. This is not to say that the
inchoate process will never lead to a formal

agreement or that formal
inappropriate in all instances.8

agreements

are

Assessing the Options
Despite this weakness, the McGill University
study provides a point of departure for exploring
this
inchoate
formal how
approach to regulating
agreements military space activities at
are less the international level may
important in be pursued in the future.
influencing Such an exploration starts
assessing
the
the conduct with
strengths
and
weaknesses
of the
of five discrete options for
military the international regulation
of military space activities.
Maintain Existing Legal Regime for
Regulating Military Space Activities
The process for establishing international
regulation of military activities in space is not
devoid of formal treaties and other international
agreements. This body of formal agreements is
anchored by the Treaty on Principles Governing
the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use
of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other
Celestial Bodies, of 1967, frequently referred to
simply as the Outer Space Treaty.9 While the

8

government policy guidance regarding military activities in
space, but it will not address the domestic legislative and
regulatory options.
6
Webster’s Encyclopedic Unabridged Dictionary of the
English Language defines inchoate, among other ways, as
“not organized; lacking order.”
7
This distinct treatment of outer space and territorial
airspace emerged despite contentions by the U.S. Air Force
that both were part of a continuum. For a description of the
Air Force’s views on this issue, see Benjamin S. Lambeth,
Mastering the Ultimate High Ground: Next Steps in the
Military Uses of Space, (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND,
2003), pp. 37–59.

The United States recently cast the sole vote in
opposition to a United Nations General Assembly
resolution to develop additional transparency and
confidence-building measures regarding activities in outer
space. The broad scope of the resolution and the openended agenda it establishes invited U.S. opposition. A
more narrowly drawn resolution on transparency and
confidence-building measures, however, could serve U.S.
interests if it codifies a clear pattern of behavior that has
served U.S. interests to date. For a text of the resolution,
see “Resolution Adopted by the General Assembly: 60/66.
Transparency and confidence-building measures in outer
space activities,” 61st plenary meeting, 8 December 2005.
9
For the text of the Outer Space Treaty and a brief
description of the negotiating history, see United States
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Arms Control and
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content of the Outer Space Treaty is far broader
than the regulation of military activities in space,
its provisions include a number of limitations on
such activities.
Article IV prohibits the
placement of weapons of mass destruction in
orbit around the Earth, on the Moon and other
celestial bodies, or anywhere else in outer space.
The same article also prohibits the placement of
military installations, the conduct of weapons
tests, and the conduct of military maneuvers on
the Moon and other celestial bodies.
Other treaties are more appropriately described as
arms control treaties that contain provisions
related to military activities in space. For
example, Article I of the 1963 Treaty Banning
Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in
Outer Space and Under Water, commonly
referred to as the Limited Test Ban Treaty,
prohibits the conduct of nuclear weapon test
explosions in outer space.10
Continuing to observe the existing regime of
international agreements regulating military
activities in space is essentially an argument for
maintaining the status quo. The most common
argument against this option is that the existing
legal regime is not broad enough and that some
military activities currently not prohibited by the
regime should be banned. These arguments most
frequently come from those seeking to limit U.S.
military options in space. Among the activities
that some would seek to ban are the development,
testing, and deployment of anti-satellite weapons
and space-based non-nuclear ballistic missile
defense interceptors.11

Disarmament Agreements: Texts and Histories of the
Negotiations (Washington, D.C.: ACDA, 1990), pp. 52–63.
10
For the text of the Limited Test Ban Treaty and a brief
description of the negotiating history, see ibid., pp. 37–49.
11
L. Skotnikov, Permanent Representative of the Russian
Federation, Statement at Plenary Meeting of the Conference
on Disarmament, “Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer
Space,” 26 August 2004. Cited hereafter as Skotnikov
Statement.

Other arguments against simply maintaining the
legal status quo assume there are fundamental
shortcomings in the current regime’s existing
provisions or the potential for significant
advantages derived from new approaches. If the
current legal regime contains errors of omission,
as some contend, it almost certainly contains
errors of commission. For example, Article IV of
the Outer Space Treaty prohibits the placement of
military installations on the Moon. Simply
accepting the status quo in perpetuity in this case
assumes that the United States will never have a
compelling security interest in placing a military
installation on the Moon. At a minimum, it is
plausible that the United States will find such an
interest at some point in the future.
Strengthen Existing International Legal
Regime for Regulating Military Space Activities
This option would identify ways to broaden the
application of the existing international legal
regime regarding military space activities that fall
short of amending existing agreements or
negotiating new ones. Among these are (1)
seeking universal state participation in all five
multilateral space law treaties; (2) using the
consultative mechanism in Article IX of the Outer
Space Treaty to regulate military activities in
accordance with proper interpretations of the
Treaty; (3) increasing transparency regarding
military activities in space by expanding the
information that state parties provide under the
1975 Convention on the Registration of Objects
Launched into Outer Space, or Registration
Convention; and (4) adding a dispute settlement
mechanism to the procedures of the International
Telecommunications Union, particularly with
regard to preventing “harmful interference” with
military space missions.12
In substantive terms, this option suffers from the
same shortcomings as those that apply to the
option of maintaining the international legal
12

Institute of Air and Space, “Policy and Legislative
Options,” pp. 7–10.
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status quo. Fundamentally, it leaves little room
for addressing developing problems regarding the
regulation of military activities in space or for
remedying existing problems within the
international legal framework. The proper scope
of interpretation under the various applicable
treaties, and most particularly those in the
category of regulating both civilian and military
activities in space, is simply too narrow.
Further,
any
attempt to go the Senate has been
beyond
the particularly
traditional scope
reluctant to
of interpreting a
treaty will be very approve treaties
risky.
In the with far-reaching
United States, the security
Senate, which has implications
the constitutional
authority
to
consent to the ratification of treaties, may quickly
conclude that a far-reaching reinterpretation of an
existing treaty is an attempt to circumvent it.
This is because the executive branch is legally
bound to execute a treaty ratified by the Senate in
a manner that is consistent with its terms.
Substantive changes in a treaty require formal
amendment, subject to Senate advice and consent.
As a result, a proposal to expand significantly the
reporting requirements under the Registration
Convention by interpretation, for example, could
prompt objections from the U.S. Senate.13
The Senate also has been particularly reluctant to
approve treaties with far-reaching security
implications that include mandatory dispute

settlement powers lodged in international
organizations. This issue is a contributing factor
in the U.S. determination not to ratify the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.14 An
attempt to establish such a mechanism under the
International Telecommunications Union will
likely meet similar objections.
Adopt New Multilateral Agreements to
Regulate Military Space Activities
This approach would remedy perceived
shortcomings in the existing legal regime for
regulating military activities in space by formally
amending the regime, in many cases by treaty.
Substantive proposals to do this include: (1)
amending the Registration Convention to expand
transparency, which, as noted above, would
attempt to do so by interpretation; (2) a
multilateral treaty establishing a code of conduct
governing military activities in space;15 (3) a
multilateral agreement to ban a specific type of
space-based weapon, such as an anti-satellite
weapon; and (4) a multilateral agreement to ban
comprehensively all types of “space-based
weapons.”16 The strength of this approach is that
it affords states the opportunity to address the full
array of issues regarding the conduct of military
activities in space.
The process of negotiating new agreements,
however, has a fundamental drawback. Leaving
aside the specific objections to specific future
agreements, including issues of verification and
enforcement, the problem with new treaties or
formal agreements is that the negotiation process
is too blunt and inflexible to make immediate
contributions to strengthening U.S. national

13

Compliance with the Registration Convention has been
spotty. The issue of obtaining compliance with Convention
should not be confused with the issue of expanding the
substantive requirements of the Convention through
reinterpretation. The Senate is not likely to object to efforts
to obtain compliance, while it is likely to object to certain
reinterpretations. For an explanation of the problems of
compliance with the Registration Convention, see Jonathan
McDowell, “Adherence to the 1976 Convention on
Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space.”

14

Marjorie Ann Browne, “The Law of the Sea
Convention and U.S. Policy,” (Washington, D.C.:
Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 2
March 2004), p. 10.
15
For a comprehensive description of a code of conduct
governing activities in space, see “Code of Conduct for
Outer Space,” (Washington, D.C.: Henry L. Stimson
Center).
16
Skotnikov Statement.
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security relative to space-based activities.
Technological advancements are too rapid to
regulate through this process. This is the case
despite the relatively long timelines for the
development and deployment of space systems.
The negotiations will generally lag behind the
technological advancements.
The alternative is to negotiate sweeping
prohibitions
without
understanding
what
technologies may be applicable. This alternative
will lead to confusion and ultimately prove
unable to stand the test of time. For example,
Article V of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile
(ABM) Treaty sought to ban the development,
testing, and deployment of all possible ABM
systems or components based in space, among
other places. Article VI sought to ban giving
non-ABM systems an ABM capability.17 ABM
Treaty negotiators, recognizing this problem,
attached Agreed Statement D to the Treaty.18
This statement conceded that the prohibitions
included in the Treaty would be subject to further
negotiations if ABM technologies “based on
other physical principles” emerged.
This
contradiction led to an explosive debate over the
“narrow” and “broad” interpretations of the ABM
Treaty in the United States.19 In an extraordinary
step, the United States withdrew from the ABM
Treaty in 2002. While many important treaties,
including the ABM Treaty, contain withdrawal
provisions, exercising the withdrawal provisions
is rarely done. The sweeping nature of the
prohibitions included in the Treaty was a

17

For the text of the ABM Treaty and a brief description
of the negotiating history, see United States Arms Control
and Disarmament Agency, Arms Control and Disarmament
Agreements, pp. 157–161.
18
Ibid., p. 162.
19
For a brief description of this debate, see Lt. Col. Peter
L. Hays, United States Military Space: Into the TwentyFirst Century INSS Occasional Paper 42, (USAF Academy,
Colo.: Institute for National Security Studies, September
2002), pp. 92-95.

contributing factor in President George W.
Bush’s decision to withdraw.20
Adopt New Military Space Agreements
at the Bilateral or Regional Level
This option attempts to limit the procedural
complexity stemming from the negotiation of
broad-based multilateral treaties.
It also
recognizes that the preeminent forum for such
broad-based negotiations, the United Nations
Conference on Disarmament, is ineffective. 21
This option also recognizes that even broadly
accepted arms control agreements can be
negotiated by a few states at the outset. The
Limited Test Ban Treaty, for example, was
initially negotiated by a five-state subcommittee
of the Conference on Disarmament in 1955.22
The chief shortcoming of this option is the same
as the option above. The negotiation process is
likely to remain lengthy, and the pace of
technological advancement is all but certain to
outstrip the pace of negotiations. This approach
also carries the inherent shortcoming that the
geography of space makes it an unlikely subject
for bilateral or regional negotiations that could
later have global applications. For example,
negotiations to set demarcations of territorial
waters between states have helped to establish
more broadly accepted principles on rights of
transit for shipping. Space does not offer a
similar opportunity. In fact, regulating military
activities in space is best suited to a broadly
participatory set of negotiations if a formal
negotiating process is the preferred approach.
Otherwise, the bilateral and regional process
could become unwieldy, particularly if more
states engage in activities in space.
20

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,
“Administration Missile Defense Papers,” (Washington,
D.C.: Carnegie Endowment, July 2001).
21
Task Force on the United Nations, “American Interests
and UN Reform,” (Washington, D.C.: United States
Institute of Peace, 2005), pp. 74 and 84.
22
United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency,
Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements, pp. 37–44.
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Adopt Unilateral Declarations
Arms control advocates sometimes point to this
approach as a means for initiating a diplomatic
process that will prevent the “weaponization of
space.” Specifically, they point to Russia’s
October 2004 unilateral declaration at the United
Nations Conference on Disarmament that it
would not be “the first [state] to deploy any
weapons in outer space….”23 In fact, the option
of pursuing unilateral declarations is the one most
in keeping with the inchoate process for
regulating military activities in space.
The critical difference between the option of
issuing unilateral declarations and the inchoate
process is that the inchoate process is far broader,
both substantively and in the means of pursuit.
Substantively, the inchoate process is not focused
exclusively or even predominantly on arms
control.
At the outset, President Dwight
Eisenhower sought to use the inchoate process to
establish the freedom of passage for vehicles
through space.24 His effort had little to do with
arms control but much to do with monitoring the
Soviet Union.
Moreover, unilateral declarations are but one
effective procedural tool available to the inchoate
process. Other tools include unilateral actions,
collective actions, and joint declarations. In fact,
unilateral and collective actions are the most
effective because the pattern of behavior that
emerges is likely to have the most powerful
impact on regulating military activities in space.
In this case, the cliché that actions speak louder
than words is clearly applicable. Further, the
inchoate process, unlike the option of issuing
unilateral declarations, is anything but
transparent. Many of the actions the United
23

Center for Defense Information, CDI Russia Weekly,
(Washington, D.C.: CDI, 14 October 2004).
24
R. Cargill Hall, “National Space Policy and Its
Interaction with the U.S. Military Space Program,” in
Military Space and National Policy: Record and
Interpretation (Washington, D.C.: George C. Marshall
Institute, 2006); and McDougall, Heavens and Earth.

States has taken in space were based on secret
presidential directives and National Security
Council documents.25

Past Operation of the Inchoate Process
Recognizing that the inchoate process has been
used extensively in the past to regulate military
activities in space is essential to understanding its
merits as a procedural approach for regulating
such activities in the future. Depending on this
approach in the future will not represent a sharp
departure from the approach that has been used to
date. Three examples demonstrate why this is so.
Dominance of Intelligence
Operations over Military Operations
As noted, the Eisenhower Administration sought
to establish a U.S. national security presence in
space for intelligence reasons more than for
military reasons. This determined national policy
rendered international agreements to regulate
national security activities
in space problematic,
the inchoate given that the relationship
process is not between intelligence and
focused the diplomatic process is at
This
exclusively or best tenuous.
served
to
even limitation
restrain such diplomacy
predominately on
even in the narrower area
arms control of regulating military
activities in space. For
example, it is unclear at what point an
intelligence activity becomes a military targeting
activity.26 In the end, both the United States and
the Soviet Union came to accept such satellite
25

R. Cargill Hall, compiler, “Presidential Decisions:
NSC Documents, Supplement: Newly Declassified
Excerpts,” (Washington, D.C.: George C. Marshall
Institute, National Security Space Project, 2006).
26
The Soviet Union, for example, rejected President
Eisenhower’s “Open Skies” proposal in 1955 in part
because it viewed such monitoring as a targeting activity.
See Hall, “National Space Policy and Its Interaction with
the U.S. Military Space Program,” p. 2.
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monitoring without a specific international
agreement legitimizing these activities. In short,
the pattern of behavior between the two
superpowers was a more powerful driver than the
diplomatic process.
This is not to say that the predominant role of
intelligence activities in space closed off all
formal diplomacy for regulating military
activities in space, just that formal agreements
followed the pattern of behavior established
primarily by the United States and the Soviet
Union. Article IV of the
no treaty defines Outer Space Treaty
the upper limit of banned the deployment of
of
mass
airspace and the weapons
destruction in space and
lower limit of prohibited the placement
space of military installations on
celestial bodies such as
the Moon. Further, there
were limited provisions in later treaties that did
extend legitimacy to space-based intelligence
activities. For example, Article XII of the ABM
Treaty barred interfering with “national technical
means of verification” of the Treaty’s provisions,
and Article V of the 1972 Interim Agreement
Between the United States of America and the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Certain
Measures with Respect to the Limitation of
Strategic Offensive Arms contained a similar
provision.27
The limited areas of formal
agreement, however, meant that the process of
tacitly accepting national security activities in
space, consistent with the inchoate process, was
the dominant approach to international regulation.
Lack of Demarcation Between
Territorial Airspace and Outer Space
To this day, there is no formal treaty or non-treaty
international agreement that defines the upper
limit of territorial airspace and the lower limit of
27

For the text of the Interim Agreement, see United
States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Arms
Control and Disarmament Agreements, pp. 169–171.

outer space. The Outer Space Treaty does not
include a definition. Nevertheless, states have
generally come to accept that there is a
fundamental difference between the two and
behave in a way that tacitly acknowledges that
there is some kind of demarcation line.
The lack of a formal definition, generally
speaking, has not led to unintended conflicts or
destabilizing actions between or among states.
While the fact that there exists a zone where
aircraft cannot fly due to the lack of atmosphere
and where satellites are unable to maintain orbit
contributes to this fortunate outcome, it is also an
argument that demonstrates the strength of the
inchoate process for regulating military activities
in space.
The informal and unstructured
approach to regulating military activities in space,
even with respect to something as simple and
fundamental as establishing the geographic
definition of space, has produced few adverse
outcomes.
Distinctions between Space and Celestial
Bodies as International Territory and
Space Vehicles as Sovereign Property
This example demonstrates how the inchoate
process can lead ultimately to formal
international agreements. At the outset of the
space age, it was unclear whether space was an
extension of territorial airspace. It was also
unclear whether satellites, like national flag
vessels on the high seas, would be afforded the
protection of sovereign property. As the United
States and the Soviet Union, by their behavior,
came to accept outer space as international
territory, they also behaved in a way that treated
their satellites as sovereign property.
In 1961, the United Nations General Assembly
(UNGA) adopted Resolution 1721, which called
for national authorities to register satellites with
international authorities.28 In 1963, the UNGA
adopted Resolution 1884, which designated states
28

Hays, United States Military Space, pp. 80–81.
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as the responsible powers for all activities in
space and sought to assign states jurisdiction
regarding spacecraft.29 The issue of national
jurisdiction over spacecraft was formally codified
in the Outer Space Treaty in 1967.30 Agreements
requiring the return of satellites to the launching
state (Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts,
the Return of Astronauts and the Return of
Objects Launched into Outer Space), establishing
liability for the damage caused by satellites and
other spacecraft (Convention on International
Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects),
and registering satellites (Convention on
Registration of Objects Launched into Outer
Space) were adopted in 1968, 1972, and 1976,
respectively.31
While national entities were ultimately given
jurisdiction over the spacecraft they launched or
registered by formal agreements, these
agreements followed the behavior patterns
established primarily by the United States and the
Soviet Union. They did not establish initial rules
in abstract terms that the early space powers were
then forced to observe.

The Moon Agreement and Proceeding
with Formal Agreements First: An
Example of Overreaching?
If formal agreements followed established
patterns of behavior regarding national
jurisdiction over satellites and other spacecraft,
the opposite approach was taken to prohibit
claims of sovereignty over and the emplacement
of military installations on the Moon and other
celestial bodies. Article II of the Outer Space
Treaty prohibits claims of sovereignty, and
29

Ibid., p. 80.
Ibid., pp. 81–86.
31
Institute of Air and Space, “Policy and Legislative
Options for Parliamentarians Regarding Possible
Deployment of Further Military Capabilities in Outer
Space,” p. 5; see also M.V. Peterson, International Regimes
for the Final Frontier (Albany, NY: State University of
New York Press, 2005).
30

Article IV prohibits the placement of military
installations.
The Outer Space Treaty was
opened for signature in 1967 and entered into
force in 1968, well before Neil Armstrong’s July
1969 Moon landing.
The general prohibitions regarding celestial
bodies established in the Outer Space Treaty were
strengthened and specified in the Agreement
Governing the Activities of States on the Moon
and Other Celestial Bodies.32 Commonly referred
to as the Moon Agreement, it was opened for
signature in 1979 and entered into force in 1984.
The United States has opted not to join, and only
12 states are currently participants; an additional
four states have signed the Agreement but have
yet to ratify it.33
The mere fact of such limited participation in the
Moon Agreement should serve as a warning
about attempts to regulate either commercial or
military activities in space by initially adopting
sweeping prohibitions that are not based on at
least an initial pattern of behavior by relevant
states.
In addition, circumstances serve to
indicate, although do not prove, that limitations
imposed by the relevant provisions of the Outer
Space Treaty and the Moon Agreement have
curtailed efforts to develop the Moon, whether for
economic or military gain. Klaus Heiss of High
Frontier, for example, has argued that
technological advancements should make it
feasible to reap both economic and national
security gains from a permanent human presence
32

For the text of the Agreement, see United Nations
Treaties and Principles on Outer Space: Text of Treaties
and Principles Governing the Activities of States in the
Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Adopted by the United
Nations General Assembly (New York: United Nations,
2002), pp. 27-35.
33
U.S. Department of State response to author’s query,
24 May 2006. The following states have ratified the Moon
Agreement: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Chile, Kazakhstan,
Mexico, Morocco, the Netherlands, Pakistan, Peru,
Philippines, and Uruguay. The following states have signed
the Moon Agreement but have not ratified it: France,
Guatemala, India, and Romania.
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on the Moon.34 Yet attempts to develop the
Moon have not been made.
The current
circumstances certainly suggest that the
prohibitions regarding the exploitation of the
Moon that are present in both the Outer Space
Treaty and the Moon Agreement have been a
contributing factor in the lack of a determined
effort to establish a permanent human presence
on the Moon. The opportunity costs derived from
this lack of effort are incalculable.

and determined leadership of President
Eisenhower at the outset of the space age served
to drive the inchoate process regarding the
international regulation of all national security–
related space activities for several decades. This
is not to say, however, that all aspects of this
policy will be transparent to foreign states and the
public at large. President Eisenhower’s policy
was no less clear or determined because major
portions of it were kept secret.

The Inchoate Process: How It May
Work in the Future

The pillars of this national policy should
include—but should not necessarily be limited
to—the following:

Past use of the inchoate process for the regulation
of both broader national security and narrower
military activities in space provides compelling
evidence that this process can continue to work in
future. The inherent flexibility and adaptability
of this process mean that advances in technology,
changes in the threat and other political
circumstances, and changes in military
requirements will not undermine its effectiveness
as a tool. The same characteristics will reduce
the risks to national security resulting from
miscalculation or mistake in negotiating and
entering into formal treaties and other
international agreements.
As the United States continues to use the inchoate
process to regulate military activities in space, it
should observe seven guiding principles.
Establishing Clear and Determined National
Policy. Precisely because an inchoate process for
regulating military activities in space at the
international level is informal and open-ended, it
requires a clearly defined and visionary national
policy toward space. Only a clear national policy
can specify properly the patterns of behavior that
will define the scope and content of international
regulation of future military activities in space
that serves the national interest. The visionary
34

Klaus P. Heiss, “Tapping the Wealth of the Moon,”
The Journal of Social, Political and Economic Studies, Vol.
29, No. 1 (Spring 2004).

Adopting a maritime-based model. Past actions
regarding the management of U.S. military
activities in space have been more in keeping
with the maritime tradition than with the
application of air power. Roughly speaking, the
United States has treated outer space more like
the high seas than territorial airspace. It has
treated satellites and other spacecraft more like
naval vessels in international waters.
The
exception has been the treatment of celestial
bodies, particularly the Moon. The maritime
tradition assumes that unclaimed territories would
be subject to national appropriation as a natural
outgrowth of the process of exploration. Ties to
the appropriated lands, both commercial and
military, were maintained through the application
of sea power.
U.S. national policy
regarding
military
activities in space
should sustain and
expand upon the
traditions
already
partially established
regarding the treatment of outer space and
satellites and spacecraft. Regarding the military
exploitation of celestial bodies, and most
particularly the Moon, U.S. policy should move
away from existing precedents and toward a
policy more in keeping with the maritime

the United States
should seek
practical control
over high-value
areas of the Moon
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tradition. Specifically, the United States should
seek to obtain practical control over high-value
areas of the Moon, although the point at which
this will require changing the existing web of
international agreements regarding the Moon and
other celestial bodies is unclear.
Defending the homeland against attacks from
and through space. The highest priority of any
nation’s defense policy is to protect the homeland
against attack. It matters little, from the broad
perspective, whether such attacks originate from
across borders on land, from the sea, through the
air, or through space.
Today, the greatest threat to the U.S. homeland
from space is ballistic missiles. Since most types
of these missiles spend significant portions of
their flight times in space, the most effective
defenses will likewise be deployed in space. 35
U.S. policy should direct the military to deploy
effective space-based interceptors for countering
ballistic missiles in flight as soon as possible.
Ensuring the survivability of space assets. The
U.S. Navy’s first order of business is to design,
build, and deploy vessels that can operate in the
maritime environment and defend themselves
against attack. This means that the Navy must
also maintain a fleet that is large enough for the
loss of vessels to natural causes or purposeful
attack not to render the Navy incapable of
fulfilling its missions.
The same approach should apply to U.S. military
spacecraft. They should be designed to protect
themselves through both active and passive
defenses. This starts with a robust capability to
detect, track, and target any and all threats to their

survival. U.S. policy should further direct that
the fleet of spacecraft is large enough that
replacements may be deployed quickly and
efficiently in the event of losses.
Protecting space lines of communication. The
Navy recognizes that the seas are places through
which international military forces and commerce
transit. Despite the fact that international waters
are outside the national jurisdiction of the United
States, the Navy takes it upon itself to provide the
practical means to insure the security of these
channels of activity by confronting states that
make unjustified territorial claims or that take
forceful action to interrupt peaceful transit.
Space also hosts important channels of military
and commercial activity. These channels are
expanding in both volume and importance. U.S.
policy should insure that U.S. space forces are
capable of protecting these channels against
attack. The task of protecting space lines of
communication can start with the development of
military capabilities to protect U.S. government
and commercial satellites against attacks designed
to curtail operations or disrupt their orbits.
Protecting rights of passage and commerce.
From the outset of the space age, it has been U.S.
policy to establish the right of passage through
space. This policy has been largely successful.
This makes space functionally equivalent to the
sea regarding the exercise of these rights.
It is critical to recognize that, ultimately, these
rights at sea are protected not by international
agreements that proclaim them, but by the might
of the U.S. Navy. International agreements
proclaiming the same rights regarding space will
likewise prove insufficient to protect them.36
U.S. military power must be sufficient to counter

35

For a detailed description of how best to counter
ballistic missiles with space-based interceptors, including
how to address issues related to the international regime
governing military activities in space, see Missile Defense,
the Space Relationship, and the Twenty-First Century,
Report of the Independent Working Group on Missile
Defense (Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, Cambridge,
Mass., and Washington, D.C., 2006).

36

For discussion of the complex relationship between
military and civilian operators in space, see Elizabeth
Waldrop, “Integration of Military and Civilian Space
Assets: Legal and National Security Implications, Air Force
Law Review, Spring 2004.

10

Space and Defense, Fall 2006

any significant challenges to these rights, both by
states and non-state actors.
Maintaining the ability to project power through
space. Projecting U.S. power over the sea has
been a key Navy task since shortly after the
founding of the nation. During World War II, the
German government revolutionized warfare when
it demonstrated its ability to project military
power through space by launching V-2 rockets.
The United States and the Soviet Union came to
dominate this capability during the Cold War by
fielding large numbers of nuclear-armed ballistic
missiles. Many nations are now following suit by
fielding their own ballistic missiles.
In the future, power could well be projected
through space by means other than ballistic
missiles. These could include manned space
planes and directed energy weapons. U.S. policy
should therefore direct that the military maintain
an unquestioned advantage in the means of
projecting power through space. This is not to
say that procuring and deploying these
capabilities will be an easy task. Ultimately, it
will depend on bringing the relevant technologies
to maturity.
Adopt Flexible Tactics
If the inchoate process for regulating military
activities in space at the international level
demands a determined national policy to make it
useful in furthering the national interest, it also
requires flexible tactics. The chief advantage in
the process’s informality is that it will not result
in the establishment of international rules that
redound to the nation’s disadvantage following
the occurrence of unforeseen events.
Therefore, U.S. policy should not allow the
appearance of inconsistency to prevent it from
adopting new and different approaches to
maintaining its military advantage in space. For
example, a U.S. technological breakthrough on a
flexible and cost-effective means for removing

space debris may allow an approach to protecting
space lines of communication that emphasizes
mitigation over prevention. Indeed, responding
to such developments should be seen as a natural
part of the establishment of a pattern of behavior
that will form a sturdy basis for the international
regulation of military activities in space. It is in
keeping with the common-law tradition in the
domestic setting.
Recognize the Preeminence of State
Sovereignty as the Core of the Inchoate Process
A rational process for regulating military
activities in space at the international level must
be based on recognition of
the preeminence of state
U.S. policy
should direct the sovereignty. The system
of state sovereignty is
military to
under attack from forces
maintain an
below and above; it needs
unquestioned
to be defended. 37
The
forces
that
are
attacking
advantage in
projecting power state sovereignty from
below are those of civil
through space
conflict and chaos and are
not relevant to the issue of
regulating military activities in space. On the
other hand, the forces attacking state sovereignty
from above are quite relevant.
Leaders of the United Nations Secretariat and
UN-related organizations are demonstrating an
ambition to override state sovereignty by
arrogating to them the power to arbitrate disputes
between states.38 The inchoate process is ideally
37

For forceful arguments in favor of shoring up the state
system, see Jeremy A. Rabkin, The Case for Sovereignty:
Why the World Should Welcome American Independence
(Washington, D.C.: AEI Press, 2004), and George P.
Shultz, “A Changed World,” The Henry A. Kissinger
Lecture at the Library of Congress, 11 February 2004, as
transcribed by the Foreign Policy Research Institute.
38
The mandatory dispute settlement procedures under the
1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea are
prime examples of this arrogation of power. This example
is particularly relevant to the issue of the international
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suited to thwarting this arrogation of power
because it is largely incompatible with the
creation of international organizations that have
every incentive to expand their authority. Under
no circumstances should the United States enter
into a treaty or other international agreement that
gives an international organization the authority
to arbitrate disputes between participating states
regarding military activities in space. At most,
the powers of such international organizations
should extend only to mediating such disputes.
Account for the Presence
of Private Assets in Space
Clearly, space is not the exclusive domain of
governments. Private entities have an extensive
presence in space as well. The inchoate process
for regulating military activities in space provides
sufficient flexibility to allow national authorities,
and most specifically military authorities, to
establish responsibilities for defending privately
held assets in space. Ultimately, it is the private
sector’s use of space that will generate wealth and
prosperity.
The proper role of national militaries in defending
the space-based assets of private citizens is not
entirely clear at this time. In the case of the
United States, the military has not focused as
much attention on defending the privately held
space assets of U.S. citizens or corporations as it
has on defending government assets that will
provide direct support to space-related and other
military operations.39 This is not solely an issue
of national policy. The responsibilities the U.S.
military assumes in this area are likely to set the
regulation of military activities in space because these
dispute settlement procedures could be used to curtail U.S.
Navy operations. See Baker Spring, “The United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea,” testimony before the
House Committee on International Relations, 12 May 2004.
39
For example, the military’s Joint Doctrine for Space
Operations hardly mentions the military’s role in defending
the interests and assets of private U.S. citizens operating in
space. See Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Doctrine for Space
Operations, Joint Publication 3-14, 9 August 2002.

standard for other nations. The inchoate process
for regulating these activities at the international
level will allow national militaries to establish the
pattern of behavior that can win broad
understanding and support.
Recognize that Intelligence Activities
in Space are Becoming Less Dominant
At the outset of the space age, intelligence
activities dominated military activities in space.
The inchoate process was particularly suited to
this circumstance because much of this
intelligence activity was presumed to be “extra
legal” and beyond the reach of formal
diplomacy.40
Clearly, the dominance of
intelligence activities in space is ebbing, and the
direct military uses of space are coming to the
fore. Nevertheless, the inchoate process for the
international regulation of national security and
military activities in space can continue to be
effective even though more open military
activities in space are becoming the more
powerful driver.
Given the more open nature of presumably legal
military activities, however, the pressure to adopt
formal regulations at the international level will
grow. On balance, giving in to this pressure will
be unwise. The U.S. military, although in a
somewhat different manner, will be able to take
advantage of the flexibility inherent in the
inchoate process, as the intelligence community
has to date. This is not an argument in favor of
the military adopting methods more in keeping
with the intelligence community, but to recognize
that the inherent flexibility in the inchoate process
will provide the military wider opportunities to
adapt to technological advances and international
political developments in space.

40

R. Cargill Hall, “National Space Policy and the U.S.
Military Space Program,” p. 2; and Gerald M. Steinberg,
Satellite Reconnaissance: The Role of Informal Bargaining
(New York: Praeger Publishers, 1983).
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Focus on Facilitating the Conduct of
Military Space Activities, Not Limiting Them
A key advantage of the inchoate process for
regulating military activities in space is that it
affords the U.S. military greater freedom of
action. Many, however, view the process of
regulating
military
activities
in
space
predominantly as an arms control exercise. 41
Arms control is designed to deprive national
militaries of their freedom of action. On the other
hand, not all international regulations, particularly
those that are informal and observed as a matter
of practice, limit freedom of action. For example,
international regulation that establishes rights of
passage will increase the military’s freedom of
action. Such regulations, generally speaking, are
not products of an arms control process.
While space arms control can have a role in the
international regulatory process, it should be
pursued cautiously and applied narrowly.
Generally speaking, the United States should be
conscious of two things regarding space arms
control: First, competitor states, recognizing the
U.S. lead in military space capabilities, will
attempt to use arms control to buy time and
ultimately to catch up with the United States; and,
second, a space arms control agreement will serve
the national interest if it effectively blocks an
unwelcome advancement by a competitor state
while not denying the U.S. military a valuable
capability.
From this perspective, a nonproliferation
approach to space arms control is likely to be
superior to comprehensive bans on certain
weapons
or
systems.
An
effective
nonproliferation policy, for example, could result
in an approach that encourages states to abandon
programs for deploying their own space systems
in exchange for select services provided by U.S.
systems. The access to such services would be
curtailed if the services were used for

inappropriate purposes. Such a nonproliferation
policy does not necessarily require formal treaties
or agreements.
Consider that Space is Already “Weaponized”
Certain arms control advocates argue that if the
United States takes certain steps, such as
deploying
space-based
missile
defense
interceptors or anti-satellite weapons, it will be
the first to weaponize space. This argument is
based on the assumption that space is not now
weaponized.42 Inconvenient for the proponents of
this view is the fact that space was weaponized at
the time the Germans launched the first V-2
rocket during World War II. The clever use of
definitions, such as one that excludes ballistic
missiles, is designed to make it appear that the
United States will be acting in a provocative way
if it takes these steps.
This line of reasoning
For
competitor is flawed.
states, example, it would
assert that for the
recognizing the United States to defend
U.S. lead in its territory against a
military space missile attack that has
capabilities, already been launched
the
defensive
will attempt to if
use arms interceptors are located
in space is somehow
control to buy provocative. By this
time logic, the initial launch
of the missile attack by
a U.S. enemy is not provocative. The spacebased defensive response is defined as
unacceptably provocative. U.S. civilian and
military leaders, under certain circumstances,
must be prepared to explain to the public that the
steps they are taking regarding military activities
in space are reasonable and entirely in keeping
with similar military actions in other contexts,
42

41

Michael Krepon, Space Assurance or Space
Dominance?

Jeffrey Lewis, “What If Space Were Weaponized?
Possible Consequences for Crisis Scenarios,” Center for
Defense Information, 5 August 2004.
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such as operations on land, at sea, and in the air.
Otherwise, these leaders must be prepared to
explain to the public, in the wake of an attack,
why they did not utilize all available measures to
defend the nation.

The Inchoate Process and the Path
Ahead
The drive to regulate military activities in space
at the international level is nothing new, and
those concerned about strengthening U.S. military
capabilities in space need not necessarily resist
the effort in all instances. The key to whether
specific international regulatory efforts contribute
to or undermine the relative military advantage of
the United States in space will depend on how
and to what end these efforts are undertaken.
The United States has little to fear from an
international regulatory process that is inchoate.

From a position of strength, the U.S. military can
use this process to establish patterns of behavior
that
largely
accommodate
its
mission
requirements. On the other hand, the military has
much to fear from formal agreements that include
sweeping provisions.
On the positive side, the U.S. military is likely to
find that certain international regulatory measures
actually enhance its ability to achieve its aims.
Achieving positive outcomes depends on the U.S.
military’s understanding clearly what it aims to
achieve in space and acting deliberately in
achieving those aims. In most instances, and
perhaps in spite of vocal opposition, other states
are likely to accept those actions as a new
standard of behavior governing the actions of all
militaries in space. In the end, the U.S. military
may find that the inchoate process for regulating
military activities in space will help it to attain an
as yet unrealized capability of mastering space.
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The

question of what constitutes the proper
military uses of space is not just a debate over
space weapons and attacks on satellites. It is a
debate that sheds light on the fundamental
decisions that states and their citizens will have to
make over the next century as we both explore
and exploit space for its scientific, strategic, and
economic value. Furthermore, the context of this
debate changes year to year as the physical and
political environment of space changes.
Complicating the debate is the fact that while
prescriptions for response to the changing space
environment differ, the goal for most of those
involved is the same: maintaining reliable access
and use of space for all peaceful actors –
including militaries.
Arguments surrounding
space weapons or treaties normally do a great
disservice to the fact that most of the participants
in these debates agree on more things then they
perhaps realize.
Before attempting to lay out what we believe to
be the most reliable and stable U.S. strategy for
reaching this goal, it is important to review some
of the basic facts that provide a backdrop to this
debate.

The Space Environment

haven, space is a hazardous place fraught with
potential dangers to fragile satellites and
spacecraft.
Satellites orbiting Earth have to contend with a
variety of natural dangers on almost a daily basis.
Significant hazards that can disable or damage
satellites include solar radiation, geomagnetic
storms, and ionization. Satellite operators have to
monitor continually the effect of the space
environment on the upper reaches of the
atmosphere, which can expand and drag down
Low-Earth Orbit (LEO) satellites.
Further, as more and more states and commercial
users seek to exploit the advantages provided by
space systems for both economic gain and
military applications; usable near-Earth space is
beginning to become crowded. With the increase
in the number of states owning and operating
satellites from two – the United States and the
Soviet Union – during the Cold War to 41 today
(a number that is growing),1 the potential for
interference, collisions, tensions, and competition
is increasing. There are some 813 known
working satellites on orbit, with about a dozen
states able to launch their own satellites. 2 The
1

The specter of space warfare currently is not the
main threat to global space assets. Today, the
main culprit is space itself. Rather than a benign

Union of Concerned Scientists, “Satellite Data Base”
Theresa Hitchens, “International Satellite Innovation and
Cooperation,” presentation to Military Satellites 2006,
Washington, D.C., 18 April 2006, CDI Military Satellites
2006.
2
Ibid.
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growing population of satellites and satellite
operators – including commercial actors not
responsible to any one government – could lead
to increasing conflict over access to desired
orbital slots, radio frequency interference, and
liability for malfunctions or collisions that
damage other satellites. Already, several states
have made decisions about uses of radio
frequency spectrum and satellite launches that
have resulted in spats with other spacefaring
countries – and in some worrying cases, states
have questioned the legitimacy of the voluntary
International Telecommunications Union (ITU)
process for parceling out spectrum usage and
orbital slots for communications satellites.3
Another complicating factor could be the
emergence of a true space tourism industry,
which would raise new issues for deconflicting
launches and tracking space objects.
The proliferation of satellite technology is not
only horizontal but also vertical – meaning that
the level of technological sophistication among
space actors is growing, with more and more
states acquiring capabilities such as highresolution imagery, high-speed, broadband
satellite communications and low-cost, highly
maneuverable microsatellites.4
This dualpronged proliferation of satellite technology has
subsequently resulted in more states applying
space capabilities to the military sphere, possibly
leading to increased suspicion and tension among
spacefaring powers. In particular, U.S. defense
officials have expressed concern about possible
threats to U.S. space systems, as well as the
growing need to prevent potential adversaries
from deriving military benefit from space systems
in times of conflict. In addition, with a number of
3

Indonesia, China, the United Kingdom, and Russia are
among those countries who have been involved in disputes
over orbital slots; for an overview of the ITU process and
challenges to the regime see, Theresa Hitchens, Future
Security in Space: Charting a Cooperative Course,
(Washington D.C.: Center for Defense Information,
September 2004), pp. 39-50.
4
Hitchens, “International Satellite Innovation and
Cooperation.”

spacefaring powers now discussing schemes for
conducting manned research on the Moon,
asteroids or other planets, the potential for
disputes about access to planetary resources is
again emerging as an issue of discussion and
debate among experts.
But it is widely agreed that
the greatest “environmental”
threat currently facing space
operations is orbital debris.
U.S. Air Force Space
Command currently tracks
over 9,4005 manmade space
objects routinely, and has
detected some 4,500 more
that cannot yet be positively
identified or routinely tracked.6 The objects that
can be tracked reliably by the Space Surveillance
Network’s 30-odd radars and optical facilities
range in size from large satellites down to objects
ten centimeters in diameter.7
Even more
threatening is the amount of smaller-sized debris
that cannot be seen, or can only be detected
momentarily. Nuts, bolts, paint flecks, and frozen
droplets of un-burned rocket fuel all whiz around
the Earth at speeds approaching seven to eight
kilometers per second. At these speeds (and at
greater relative speeds), debris impacts have the
effect of liquefying metal and causing
catastrophic failure of satellites.8 For example,
on 29 March 2006, the Russian Ekspress AM11
communications satellite stopped operating; the
cause was determined as a hypervelocity debris

proliferation
of satellite
technology is
not only
horizontal
but also
vertical

5

NASA, Orbital Debris Quarterly News, Sara Portman,
ed, Volume 10, Issue 1, January 2006, p. 7. See also U.S.
Strategic Command (STRATCOM) Fact Sheet, Space
Control:Reentry Assessment and Space Surveillance (last
updated March 2004) Offutt Air Force Base, Neb.: U.S.
Strategic Command Public Affairs Office.
6
Author email exchange with a NASA official.
7
STRATCOM Fact Sheet, “Space Control: Reentry
Assessment and Space Surveillance.”
8
For more on laboratory testing of hypervelocity impacts
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impact.9
Such impacts, particularly in
Geosynchronous Orbit (GEO) where the satellite
(and most other large communications satellites)
was stationed, are rare; National Aeronautics and
Space Administration (NASA) computer models
predict only about ten catastrophic collisions over
the next 200 years.10 But according to a recent
study by NASA debris experts J.C. Liou and
Nicholas Johnson, even without any new
launches, the debris population will increase in
the coming centuries.11 “In reality the situation
will undoubtedly be worse, because spacecraft
and their orbital stages will continue to be
launched,” Johnson said.12
The U.S. Air Force understands the danger of
debris generation and the unintentional negative
consequences that debris can have. Deputy
Under Secretary of the Air Force Gary Payton
recently spoke out against debris generating antisatellite weapons, stating, “We’d be fools to
actually get into the kinetic energy anti-satellite
business. It would be hugely disadvantageous for
the U.S. to get into that game.”13 Nonetheless,
there remain those in the U.S. national security
community promoting the use of debris-creating
kinetic energy anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons and
space-based kinetic energy interceptors for
attacking ballistic missiles, as well as weapons
based in space that in and of themselves, by
virtue of their on-board fuel and desirability as
targets, would present a debris hazard.

9

SpaceDaily.com, “Russian Satellite Failure Caused by
Space Garbage,” 17 April 2006, accessed from Russian
Satellite Failure Caused by Space Garbage.
10
Mike Toner, “Final Frontier Littered with Junk,” Cox
News Service, 27 February 2006.
11
J.C. Liou and N.L. Johnson, “Risks in Space From
Orbiting Debris,” Science, Vol. 311, 22 January 2006.
12
Toner, “Final Frontier Junk.”
13
Jeremy Singer, “USAF Interest in Lasers Triggers
Concerns About Anti-Satellite Weapons,” Space News,
1 May 2006.

The Way Forward
The above facts about the current “state of space”
leave U.S. decision makers with a weighty
dilemma: how best to guarantee reliable access
and use of space for all peaceful actors, including
the U.S. military, while at the same time
preventing dangerous and destabilizing behaviors
in space or conflicts that threaten space assets.
Some believe that the deployment of ASATs and
space weapons now, before there is a recognized
or developed threat, would serve to dissuade any
use of force against potential U.S. targets in
space, as well as improve ground-strike
capabilities. Others believe that space is an
inherent sanctuary and that the proper response is
a pre-emptive arms control treaty, barring all
weapons, not just weapons of mass destruction,14
from space. In our view, the best approach to
ensuring future security in space can be found
somewhere in the middle of this spectrum.
Establishing good practices by all actors, based
on solid behavioral norms and the rule of law, are
at the heart of the approach laid out below.
If space is a sanctuary, this is due to political will
as well as technological and economic
limitations. During the Cold War, the United
States and the Soviet Union – after testing, and in
some cases temporarily deploying, space
weapons – realized the intricate linkage between
space assets and nuclear forces and the inherent
dangers of deeming satellites legitimate physical
targets. The primary issue was one of stability:
with space assets (i.e. spy satellites) serving as
key strategic nuclear warning systems, any
actions that were perceived by either side to
threaten their secure functioning could have dire
consequences, including accidental nuclear war.
14

The Outer Space Treaty of 1967 banned the stationing
of weapons of mass destruction in orbit. While there is
some debate as to whether the “peaceful purposes” dictum
of the OST bans the use of other types of weapons in space,
it is generally accepted that stationing or use of
conventional weapons in space is not proscribed.
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Thus, neither side moved to deploy permanently
either anti-satellite weapons or weapons based on
orbit. While the Cold War is over, the dynamics
of the space-nuclear stability equation have
changed little – with the only issue being the
emergence of new space and nuclear weapons
players who arguably have tense and inherently
less stable relations among each other than did
the United States and Soviet Union.
In addition, although access to space is growing,
it always has been and remains today a very
expensive place to operate and satellites are highcost, high-value assets, meaning that cost
considerations are always at the forefront in
weighing national security tradeoffs. A risky
security environment for satellites would
inevitably raise costs for all space actors.
The fact of the matter is that space as it relates to
national security cannot be treated the same as the
Navy treats the sea or the Air Force treats the sky.
It is physically different, and the concepts of
dominance and superiority have fundamentally
different meanings and connotations in space.
The laws of physics and the globalization of
space access dictate that no one nation, one
person or one entity can “own” space; and, more
importantly, means that the actions of any one
actor in space cannot fail to have direct
repercussions upon the space-based assets of
others. The physical and cost environments of
space described above alter the threat perceptions
of states and create a large gap between policy,
capability, and political will. By this, we mean
that policies that call for space weapons cannot,
by themselves, remove the technological
roadblocks to develop those weapons, nor can
they necessarily create the political and
diplomatic impetus to actually pay for or use
them. Even if such weapons are technically,
economically and politically feasible, the use of
anti-satellite or space-based weapons are likely to
cause more harm than good to the future access to
and use of space across the board, especially if
the weapon is debris-generating or if it can easily

be countered with a low-cost debris-generating
weapon.
Debris-generating weapons, in particular, present
a lose-lose situation, as Payton outlined above.
Further, there is a danger that the advent within
the U.S. military of dedicated ASAT weapons
using temporary and reversible means, while
directly avoiding the debris problems of kinetic or
high-powered
directed
weapons
and
space cannot energy
certainly preferable to such
be treated the destructive weapons, could
same way the lead other states to choose
Navy treats the less advanced, cheaper
sea or the Air means to counter U.S.
Force treats technological superiority.
the sky Much as we see in Iraq with
relatively
low-cost
improvised explosive device
(IEDs), the rules of warfare will be hard to dictate
in space, as they are on the ground.
Moreover, because space is a global commons
and most satellites are used for civil or
commercial activities, warfare in space would be
certain to debilitate its use for near- and mid-term
economic and scientific development. The rise of
tensions and the threat of warfare would undercut
future cooperation on space exploration, and thus
hamper long-term scientific development that
would benefit future generations.
For all of these reasons, we hold that a space war
fighting strategy based on dedicated ASATs and
space-based weapons would undercut, rather than
enhance, U.S. national security and global
security in space. Present U.S. policy and
strategy should instead be focused on establishing
good practices and the rule of law in space in
order to foster a stable basis for interaction
among space actors.
Unfortunately, as fears about the security of space
assets grow, several states – led by the United
States but also including China, India, and Israel
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– are debating the need to both protect their space
assets and prepare for space war by building
capabilities to disrupt or destroy the space assets
of potential enemies. This insecurity is in itself
dangerous because it threatens to lead to a vicious
circle whereby one nation reacts to “defend”
against a perceived threat, leading a second
nation to feel threatened by the first’s defensive
actions and take its own “defensive” actions that
further escalate the tensions – or even create
tensions that were not present in the first place.

an international space traffic management regime
(discussed below). Finally, space surveillance
and tracking provides an essential element in any
effort to build confidence and dampen threat
perceptions by increasing transparency among
actors.

Unfortunately,
surveillance
and
tracking
capabilities currently are not sufficient. There are
technical limitations that require concerted efforts
to overcome. Finding and reliably tracking space
objects, especially debris, remains a major
At the same time, we cannot ignore that U.S.
challenge, requiring a network of radar and
space assets – including its important military
optical sensors and complex computer modeling
assets – are vulnerable, and may be subject to
capabilities to project orbital trajectories. Neither
future threats. This is a serious issue and one that
of the world’s two major space surveillance
requires a coherent effort to address. A strategy
networks, the U.S. Space Surveillance Network
to protect global space access and keep space free
(SSN) and the Russian Space Surveillance
from warfare does not, and should
System (SSS) can reliably track
not, require the United States to
debris smaller than ten centimeters
debris as small as one
accept victimization and be left
in diameter (the size of a baseball)
centimeter
in
diameter
defenseless. There are common
in LEO, even though debris as small
can cause catastrophic as one centimeter in diameter can
sense steps that leadership in the
United States can take to ensure
cause catastrophic damage to a
damage to a satellite
the safety and security of its space
satellite. Further, neither system
assets.
Furthermore, there are
can reliably detect or track objects
steps that the United States can take in concert
smaller than about one meter in diameter in the
with its political and economic partners to
critical GEO where most of the world’s
increase all states confidence in secure and
communications satellites are stationed. Neither
peaceful access to space.
the SSN nor the SSS is able to track space objects
in real time, as this would require much larger
numbers of sensors. Finally, as an artifact of the
Improve Space Surveillance and
Cold War, neither the U.S. nor Russian network
Tracking
provides good coverage of near-Earth space in the
Southern Hemisphere since each network was
One of the immediate, and most important, ways
optimized to focus on the other side’s space
that space security can be improved would be
systems. 15
through an improved, better-structured system for
space surveillance and tracking. “Seeing” what is
going on in space is critical for detecting and
monitoring space debris, as well as for following
satellites and spacecraft in order to predict and
avoid potential collisions. It is also important for
diagnosing satellite failures, and for detecting and
monitoring potential deliberate threats against
space assets. Effective space surveillance would
also be the underpinning for the development of

Process issues for sharing space launch and space
surveillance data also are becoming a question as
more space actors emerge. Only the United
States routinely shares space surveillance data
with other space actors, and that process has
become more complicated due to increased
concern in the United States about the security of
15

Hitchens, “Future Security in Space,” p. 31.
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its own space assets. While the international
space industry has informal protocols for
communications about the launch, subsequent
whereabouts and health of commercial satellites,
there is not a routine, codified process for data
and information sharing in existence. Current
international instruments for registering satellite
launch and radio frequency/orbital slot allocations
– maintained by the United Nations (UN) and the
International Telecommunications Union (ITU)
respectively – are poorly complied with and
inadequate.
Further, the fact that the U.S. Air Force’s SSN
has a de facto monopoly on surveillance and
tracking data unfortunately is perceived by a
number of space actors outside the United States
as a potential problem. There are emerging fears,
including among U.S. allies and friends, that a
U.S. decision to refuse to provide data could
impinge on other state’s ability to access space;
or that data provided by the U.S. may not be
reliable, as was the case with U.S. intelligence
provided to the international community in the
run up to the American invasion of Iraq. While
we are not making a value judgment on the
validity of such fears, the fact that such
perceptions exist is, in and of itself, a worrisome
development with regard to the growing level of
tension among space actors.
Thus, as critical first steps towards both
protecting U.S. space assets and for ensuring
future access to space for all, the United States
should take a leadership role in addressing space
surveillance needs. This should include technical
research and development to improve the
capabilities of the SSN, particularly with regard
to detecting and tracking smaller sized space
debris and gaining more clarity about the
environment in GEO. Fortunately, the U.S. Air
Force has made space surveillance – and what the
service dubs “space situational awareness,” a
term that includes satellite monitoring and
diagnostics – a high priority. For example, the
service is working to improve its network of

ground-based telescopes to enhance images
digitally and make it easier to combine the
images obtained with other sources to create more
detailed pictures.16 Unfortunately, several other
key programs are in trouble. The Space Based
Space Surveillance (SBSS) system – expected to
comprise four or five satellites carrying optical
sensors for tracking objects in LEO and designed
to augment the ground-based network which
cannot see through cloud cover – is behind
schedule and the single space surveillance
satellite it is supposed to replace is likely to reach
the end of its life before the first satellite of the
new system can be launched.17 Another satellite
effort, called the Orbital Deep Space Imager and
designed to detect and track objects in GEO, was
canceled by the Air Force in early 2006.18 The
Air Force should redouble efforts – and the
Congress should support those efforts – to speed
SBSS and retarget funding to the Orbital Deep
Space Imager as soon as possible, among other
efforts to robustly fund required updates to the
SSN.
With regard to data sharing, the U.S. Department
of Defense (DOD) should move more rapidly to
set clear processes and guidelines for its new
Space-Track program for disseminating orbital
data to other states, commercial users and
researchers. Interim guidelines have been put
forward, but it remains unclear how the system
may work in future. In addition, DOD should
reverse its policies aimed at applying restrictions
on how approved users publish and redistribute
the data and analyses based on the data.
Currently, researchers must have written
permission from the Office of the Secretary of
Defense to pass on or publish data gathered
through Space-Track, including basic data such as
the number of debris in the current SSN catalog.
The basic orbital elements of any space object –
16

John A. Tirpak, “Securing the Space Arena,” Air Force
Magazine Online, Vol. 87, No. 7, July 2004.
17
Jeremy Singer, “Air Force Plans SBSS Studies,” Space
News, 27 February 2006.
18
Ibid.
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that in the past were published by NASA free to
anyone who wanted to view them – are of next to
no use to those who might wish to target
satellites; further a determined attacker could find
ways to do so without access to that data.19

regarding national capabilities but at the same
time allow wide sharing of basic, critical data.20

Finally, the U.S. government should work with
the commercial satellite industry – and the
international community – to establish clear
U.S. government and DOD officials should also
processes
for
industry-to-industry
be encouraging other states to build capacity,
communications, and to build and support a more
particularly in the area of sensors and collision
robust system for registering satellite operations
avoidance models. Although there is naturally
data. For example, immediate efforts should be
some concern on the part of the
undertaken to improve (and improve
intelligence
and
military
space
compliance with) the UN Satellite Registry,
the United
community about improved capabilities
including requiring registrants to report
States
on the part of non-U.S. actors leading to
when an object has moved from its initial
should
potential threats to U.S. satellites, there
insertion orbit, becomes dysfunctional or its
also could be some value to additional, resurrect its orbit begins to decay. In addition, the
moribund
complementary
space
surveillance
United States should resurrect, on a
process for
assets. For one thing, non-U.S. data
multinational basis starting with those states
could be used to verify findings by the
capable of space launch, its moribund
pre-launch
SSN – something that in a crisis
bilateral effort with Russia to develop a
and postsituation could be very helpful
process for pre-launch and post-launch
launch
politically. Several European countries
notification. The U.S.-Russia agreements
notification were primarily aimed at providing
currently operate radar and telescope
facilities that are used, on an occasional
transparency about ballistic missile launch,
basis, to detect and track debris. Indeed, the
but were quite detailed and the data exchange
European Union and the European Space Agency
proposed would be inherently applicable to space
are contemplating a program to link current
launch and the prevention of interference or
European assets into a unified network that could
collision.21
function independently of the U.S. SSN. The
United States should work with its European
allies to encourage such a program, but at the
same time urge the Europeans to craft a network
that would fill current gaps in the SSN and that
would function at least partially in tandem with it.
This would require that the U.S. space
surveillance community move away from its
20
Theresa Hitchens, “The Next Galileo Flap? EU Space
cultural proclivity toward excess secrecy; and that
Surveillance
Move Provides Opportunities, Challenges, for
the Europeans suppress any knee-jerk antiU.S.,”
Space
News, 16 May 2005.
American
reaction
to
the
idea
of
21
For more information regarding the June 2000 U.S.complementarities. But there is no reason that
Russian Joint Data Exchange Center and the subsequent
space surveillance data provided by overlapping,
December 2000 U.S.-Russian Pre- and Post-Launch
but separate networks, could not be produced in a
Notification Agreement, see: Lt. Col. Peter L. Hays, USAF,
United States Military Space: Into the Twenty-First
fashion that would protect necessary secrecy
19

Theresa Hitchens “Safeguarding Space: Building
Cooperative Norms to Dampen Negative Trends,”
Disarmament Diplomacy, No. 81, Winter 2005, p. 59.

Century, INSS Occasional Paper 42, USAF Academy,
Colo.: Institute for National Security Studies, September
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“Memorandum of Understanding on Notification of Missile
Launches,” 16 December 2000.
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Redundancy and Protection
Multiple reports have pointed to the
vulnerabilities that stem from the United States’
increased dependency on space assets for military
operations, homeland security, and economic
prosperity. These include the 2001 “Report of the
Commission to Assess United States National
Security Space Management and Organization,”
chaired by Donald Rumsfeld prior to his
appointment as U.S. defense secretary, and
known as the Space Commission Report. The
report famously warned of the potential of a
“Pearl Harbor” in space, and stated: “[The]
present extent of U.S. dependence on space, the
rapid pace at which this dependence is increasing
and the vulnerabilities it creates all demand that
U.S. national security space interests be
recognized as a top national security priority.”22
It is true that U.S. satellite systems have both
inherent,
and
unfortunately
sometimes
engineered, vulnerabilities – both with regard to
the basic space environment and to potential
deliberate attacks. The prescription for resolving
this situation is the development and
implementation of a coherent strategy for both
protection of space systems – including their
terrestrial nodes – as well as for providing
redundant capabilities both in space and
terrestrially.
On this front, there already has been slow
progress. In recent years, DOD officials have
been particularly worried about the vulnerabilities
of commercial satellites, given that the military is
heavily reliant on commercial providers for its
own communications needs – especially in
wartime, when some 65-80 percent of military
communications is carried over commercial
bandwidth.23 A February 2004 report by a special
22

Report to Assess United States National Security
Space Management and Organization, 11 January 2001,
(hereafter, Space Commission Report), p. ix.
23
Richard H. Buenneke, “Commercial Satellite
Communications: Supporting Defense Transformation.”
.

Satellite Task Force of the President’s National
Security
Telecommunications
Advisory
Committee (NSTAC) highlighted commercial
satellite vulnerabilities, including the lack of
encrypted uplinks and downlinks. 24
DOD
subsequently launched a sustained effort to work
with the CEOs of major commercial providers to
come up with criteria and commercial best
practices to address security concerns and
establish reporting processes for problems.25 This
effort should continue to receive priority U.S.
government attention, and be expanded to include
working with U.S. allies and friends. Not only
are many commercial satellite providers
multinational companies, but also allied satellite
capabilities are crucial to joint operations in times
of crisis and war. In addition, in Europe there is
an increasing awareness of the importance of
satellite services to security and to European
militaries – an awareness that should help provide
a foundation for any U.S.-led efforts to build
processes that would underpin mutual security
interests.
The use of redundant systems and subsystems,
terrestrial back-up links, unmanned aerial
vehicles (UAV), high altitude airships, and onorbit spares can help to alleviate single point
failures and also provide needed emergency
assets. Again, the U.S. Air Force in particular has
recognized the potential value of non-space
systems for providing space-like capabilities and
is actively pursuing UAVs and high-altitude
solutions.26 Initiatives such as the Operationally
Responsive Space (ORS) program,27 designed to
24

The President's National Security Telecommunications
Advisory Committee, Satellite Task Force Report, Fact
Sheet, February 2004; author conversations with several
government and industry officials involved.
25
Buenneke, p. 9
26
Jeffrey Lewis, “It's a Bird, It's a Plance, It's
a....Stratelite?” Defensetech.org, 18 December 2004;
“Lockheed Wins $149.2M Contract for High Altitude
Airship (updated),” Defense Industry Daily, 16 January
2006,.
27
For an overview of the concept of ORS and some of
the difficulties that planners and engineers are encountering
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ensure rapid access to space and reconstitution of
government understand the benefits of
lost satellites, and the advent of microsatellites
cooperation, including from a strategic and
that can be networked to provide the same
intelligence context.
Recent discussions of
functionality as one large satellite, also could be
cooperation with China on space endeavors,
used to help to alleviate these failure points – as
including the visit to China by NASA
well as provide a revolutionary improvement in
administrator Michael Griffin, are positive steps
satellite costs and capabilities. However, it
in building economic and strategic confidence
should be stated that both ORS systems and
between the two states at a time when the two
microsatellites could also be weaponized, and the
militaries seem to be on a collision course with
perception that such technologies are being
regard to space.
developed for offensive or destructive purposes
must be balanced by responsible rules for their
However, there are still major barriers to
use (see below). That said, more priority – and
international cooperation – not only with China –
funding – should be placed on finding ways to
that one day may lead to conflict. Current export
prevent satellite capabilities from
regulations, such as the International
becoming single point failures for
Traffic in Arms Regulation (ITAR),
both
the U.S. military and national
while designed to ensure that select
Operationally
security community.
Responsive Space technologies do not reach the hands of
those wishing to attack U.S. targets,
systems and
also has the unintended consequence of
Civilian Cooperation
microsatellites
limiting the amount of beneficial
could
be
cooperation that can occur between
Many of the tensions during the Cold
weaponized
states in the space arena. ITAR not
War were dampened to some degree
only restricts cooperation between the
by civilian space cooperation
United States and China, but between
between the Soviet Union and the United States.
the
United
States and its allies as well as U.S.
The transparency gained by both sides and the
companies and any foreign entity. These export
subtle shifting in perceptions that came in the
restrictions do not just limit the amount of
wake of Apollo-Soyuz also cannot be discounted.
business that can be done between states; they
But joint missions such as Apollo-Soyuz
have also been identified as contributing causes to
provided not just the political appearance of
the failure of missions. For example, following
cooperation; they also laid the groundwork for
the recent failed NASA DART (Demonstration of
substantive Russian-U.S. cooperation in space
Autonomous Rendezvous Technology) mission
today. Without cooperation during the Cold War,
designed to test automatic maneuvering in space,
and smart engagement with Moscow immediately
the mishap investigation board pointed to ITAR
after the fall of the Soviet Union, the United
regulations that created “perceived restrictions” in
States would most likely lack access to the
what NASA engineers could discuss with the
International Space Station in light of the current
foreign designers of a main component that was
state of the Space Shuttle fleet.
found to be a root cause of the malfunction.28
Today, while there is no “cold warrior”
International cooperation between non-U.S.
competitor to the United States, civilian
companies is still proceeding but at a glacial pace.
cooperation with states such has China would
The United States would be wise to re-evaluate if
give each nation an opportunity to gauge each
other’s plans in space. Many in the U.S.
28

see Jeremy Singer, “Responsive Space,” Air Force
Magazine, Vol. 89, No. 3, March 2006,.

NASA, “Overview of the DART Mishap Investigation
Results,” 15 May 2006, The full report itself was not
released due to ITAR concerns.
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ITAR regulations governing space activities,
particularly commercial and civil activities, are
still in the best interest of U.S. companies and
international security, especially if those
regulations prevent cooperation that can lead to
valuable confidence building measures. The
measures in train to find ways to cooperate with
China, while protecting genuine national security
concerns, also must be continued, prioritized, and
supported by Congress and across the U.S. space
community.

Code of Conduct
The 2001 Space Commission Report also
contained an important, but oft-overlooked
recommendation:
The U.S. will require…engaging U.S. allies
and friends, and the international community,
in a sustained effort to fashion appropriate
“rules of the road” for space.29
Rules of the road, or codes of conduct, are not
new to the military sphere. They are tried and
tested ways to shape behaviors and avoid
dangerous misunderstandings and conflicts.
Perhaps the most successful and famous set of
rules of the road is the 1972 Incidents at Sea
Agreement (IncSea), signed between U.S.
Secretary of the Navy John Warner and his Soviet
counterpart.
Thirty other navies signed
subsequent
agreements.30
Today,
the
administration of President George W. Bush and
the U.S. Armed Forces champion a number of
executive-level codes of conduct designed to
fight proliferation of dangerous materials
necessary for the construction of weapons of
mass destruction (e.g. – the Proliferation Security
Initiative and the International Atomic Energy
Agency Code of Conduct on the Safety and
Security of Radioactive Sources).

29

Space Commission Report, p. 18.
Michael Krepon, “Ground Rules for Space,” Bulletin
of the Atomic Scientists, May/June 2005, p. 68.
30

A code of conduct for space would not have to be
negotiated in a multinational forum like a treaty,
nor would it need to be subject to ratification in
the U.S. Senate. A sustained effort on the part of
the United States would only require finding
another state, or states, willing to agree upon
appropriate rules. It could even be argued that if
the United States unilaterally declared that it
would follow certain rules in space, other states
would join, based on U.S. space leadership.
However, due to the current political context, an
international effort, even if limited to a select
number of countries, would be preferable to a
unilateral declaration.
Key elements of a code of conduct for
responsible spacefaring states would include
debris mitigation, traffic management, and the
preannouncement of dangerous maneuvers such
as close passes or docking.
Debris Mitigation
The United States has been a leader in the arena
of space debris mitigation, fully supporting and
promoting international efforts to develop a
voluntary set of guidelines for space operators. In
2002,
the
Inter-Agency
Space
Debris
Coordinating Committee (IADC), comprising the
space agencies of China, France, Germany, India,
Italy, Japan, Russia, Ukraine, the United
Kingdom and the United States, plus the
European Space Agency (ESA), issued a set of
technical guidelines for debris mitigation. Those
proposed guidelines were submitted to the UN
Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space
(COPUOS) for consideration by member states.
After several years of political jockeying, a less
technically specific version of the IADC
guidelines were crafted by a working group in
June 2005 and accepted by COPUOS’s Scientific
and Technical Subcommittee at the organization’s
March 2006 meeting. 31 The voluntary guidelines,
31

United Nations Press Release, “Outer Space Scientific
and Technical Committee Concludes 43rd Session in
Vienna,” UNIS/OS/329, March 8, 2006; author
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which include a provision pledging signatories to
avoid the intentional destruction of space objects
that would create long-lived debris,32 are now
being reviewed by individual national
governments and are expected to be finally
approved in 2007.33 Not only should the United
States accept these guidelines, but it should also
continue to push for more progress in the
international arena. One effort that the United
States could lead would be military-to-military
discussions among spacefaring states aimed at
pledging to uphold strictly the mitigation
guidelines including during weapons tests. In
addition, the United States should work with
other spacefaring states to establish, based on the
voluntary guidelines, legal structures that could
reinforce compliance with best debris practices at
the international level – so as to create a level
playing field for industry and at the same time
avoid backsliding, particularly by those states
seeking entry to the international market by
offering cheap launch and satellite services to the
detriment of voluntary rules which are perceived
to increase near-term costs. For example, a
working group at COPUOS’s legal subcommittee
should be stood up to explore how the Liability
Convention could be used, or amended, to
enforce strictures against debris creation. In the
meantime, debris mitigation guidelines would be
easily absorbed into a space code of conduct.
Traffic Management
Space traffic management is also an arena where
there is slow progress toward creating rules-based
processes that could help avoid interference,
collision, and conflict in space. Since 2001, U.S.

and international industry and scientific
organizations have been examining the issues
involved with coordinating space launch and onorbit operations – many of which overlap with the
discussions regarding debris mitigation. One of
the first major reports on the subject was issued in
2001, following a series of workshops held by the
American Institute of Aeronautics and
Astronautics, called “Addressing the Challenges
of the New Millennium.” That report highlighted
the fact that current international laws and
regulatory structures fall short in providing “clear
legal guidance,” and that there exist no rules that
“prohibit new satellites being launched into orbits
that could later threaten existing satellites” or
rules regarding maneuvering of spacecraft.34
The most recent, and comprehensive, report was
issued by the International Academy of
Astronautics
in
September
2005.
The
the United
35
States could lead “IAA Cosmic Study
on
Space
Traffic
military-to- Management” lays out
military the many space traffic
discussions to challenges, overviews
uphold strict the current legal and
debris mitigation regulatory framework,
during weapons and puts forward a
framework of required
tests elements
for
addressing space traffic
in the launch phase, the on-orbit operations phase,
and the re-entry phase for debris.36 Some major
elements of the IAA framework include
clarifying liability for damages in outer space, the
34
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American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics,
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The term “cosmic” study means that the report has
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Kai-Uwe Schrogl and Petr Lala, coordinators, “ IAA
Cosmic Study Space Traffic Management,” International
Academy of Astronautics, 18 September 2005, Executive
Summary, pp. 1-11.
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establishment of “right of way rules” for objects
on orbit, establishing prioritization rights for
maneuvering, notification pre-launch, upon
maneuvering and when de-orbiting (as noted
above) and a number of debris mitigation
mechanisms mentioned previously in this
article.37 The study concludes that by 2020 “an
inter-governmental agreement could be drafted,
building on but not replacing the principles
incorporated in the existing space treaties. . . .
This international inter-governmental agreement
would comprise a legal text, which cannot be
changed easily, and technical annexes, which can
be adapted more easily, (modeled on the texts of
the ITU….)”38
The United States could, and should – as it has
done in the debris mitigation issue – take a
leadership role in building off the IAA work
toward a coherent legal framework governing
space traffic management. This would benefit the
U.S. commercial satellite industry by establishing
a level playing field for space operations and
would benefit U.S. civil and military space
programs by establishing a process for avoiding
conflicts and improving transparency regarding
other space actors. A key priority for ensuring
space security in the future will be just that:
establishing norms of behavior and rules of law
that can govern the activities of space actors in
peacetime,
including
conflict
resolution
mechanisms, sanctions, and appropriate military
responses for those who would seek to threaten
the safety of other space actors.

areas.” For example, the 1989 Prevention of
Dangerous Military Activities Agreement
between the United States and the Soviet Union
calls on land forces to initiate and remain in
constant contact if they are within predefined
areas. While zoning in space would have to have
a different physical implementation than special
caution areas on the ground, the concept would
increase security by reducing tensions and
perceived threats. Essential to a monitored and
verifiable zoning implementation would be
improved space surveillance capabilities (as
described in the previous sections).
As confirmed by DART, even planned civilian
maneuvers in space can result in collisions. It is
therefore important that responsible spacefaring
states agree to pre-notify each other before any
dangerous maneuvers – such maneuvers would
have to be defined by the states agreeing to the
rule, but may include docking, repair, or close
proximity autonomous operations.
Codes of conduct exist for almost every sphere of
military operations and international cooperation
– except space. Space also deserves such rules of
the road. While no rule can prevent bad actors
from breaking them, an agreed upon code of
conduct will encourage good behavior, increase
confidence in international relations, reduce
tensions, and provide the legal and international
support required to identify and respond to rule
breakers.

Responsible Hedging
Dangerous Maneuvers
The IAA report also recommends a concept
called “zoning” and in tandem the importance to
notify other satellite operators of planned
maneuvers. Zoning would be the space based
analog of a common naval and ground-based
military interaction, namely “special caution

It is also in the best interest of the United States
to maintain responsible hedges against an actor
who would choose to break the code of conduct
or shatter the long-standing informal space
weapons moratorium. These hedges would serve
as both a deterrent and retaliatory function,
allowing the United States to quickly respond to
unwise actions of a state or a non-state actor.
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The United States already has overwhelming
conventional capability that can serve as a hedge
against states. Since attacks on satellites can be
viewed as attacks on a state itself, under
principles of self-defense, the United States
would theoretically have the right to attack
terrestrial targets of any nation or actor
responsible. This can readily be achieved with
the current arsenal of strike weapons. In addition,
if the leadership in the United States decided that
it must respond “in kind” to an attack on its
satellites, and that such action outweighs the
consequences of using such a weapon, it could
adapt a number of current elements of its arsenal
for the mission – including missile defense
interceptors, maneuverable microsatellites, and,
in particular, jamming equipment that interferes
with a satellite’s uplinks and/or downlinks. The
latter option is one that is perhaps most useful in
the real world, given the dual-use, multinational
nature of the satellite population, because it
would allow reinstatement of the satellite’s
functions once hostilities were over.
The last element of a hedging strategy is
responsible research and development of space
negation capabilities, which stops short of testing
and deployment. Unlike the Cold War when
testing of nuclear weapons was required to
demonstrate deterrence, the fact that satellites can
be targeted and destroy is indisputable. While
testing may increase confidence in a certain
weapon system, this is outweighed by the
negative political and perhaps debris-generating
consequences of such tests, thereby reducing
confidence in the availability and reliability of
U.S. satellites themselves – and the weapon
systems which they support. Research on basic
technologies (many of which have dual-use
potentialities in any case) makes sense; taking
weapons out of the lab and testing them does not.
Some would argue that a President needs as many
options available as possible during a crisis
situation, and therefore the United States must
test and deploy space weapons now to be

available when needed. However, the usefulness
of ASATs and space-based weapons in a crisis
situation is unclear at best; taking out a satellite
would certainly not ratchet down tensions, and in
fact could lead to immediate retaliation on U.S.
space assets. U.S. security is best served by an
international security environment that is free of
space weapons, so it makes little sense for the
United States to be the first to undermine the
current status quo. Further, it is a fact of life, and
a fact of international
that
the last element of security,
a hedging strategy sometimes refusing
is research and to close one’s options
results in less, not
development of more, stability in
space negation relations with others.
capabilities short A hedging strategy is
of testing and prudent only as long
deployment as it is constructed so
as
to
avoid
prompting others to
fear that it is a cover
for a clandestine, more aggressive strategy.

Exploration Rules
The Vision for Space Exploration outlined by
President Bush in 2004 calls for a large expansion
in human exploratory missions. It also seeks
international cooperation and commercial
partnerships to help reach this goal. In parallel to
the planned technological research and
development that must be undertaken to realize
this vision and efforts to seek partnerships to
make it a reality, it would also be wise to begin
discussions on what rules and codes should
govern such exploration in future.
Such
confidence-building measures would not only be
needed to guarantee that states, individuals, and
the private sector have the correct distribution of
rights, responsibilities, and opportunities in space
but that any increased exploration and scientific
and commercial exploitation does not open new
avenues of conflict. Discussions about other
modes of confidence building regarding

27

Hitchens and Katz-Hyman, “Establishing Space Security”

exploration would be perfectly legitimate for the
United States to press with other states seeking
partnership roles in NASA’s program.

Negotiate a Weapons Ban
Once the above steps are undertaken, and to some
extent completed, states could then come together
and negotiate banning the deployment of some or
all ASATs and space weapons. This would not
be the goal of the above steps, but instead, such a
treaty-based arms ban would complement and reenforce already agreed upon rules and practices –
such as the moratorium on testing and
deployment and the linking of debris to the
Liability Convention. Further, such negotiations
could happen on a step-by-step basis. For
example, since space debris is a clear and present
danger to all space actors, it seems obvious that it
would be in everyone’s self interest to craft a
treaty designed to prevent the testing,
deployment, and use of debris-creating weaponry.
Such an agreement could also provide a basis for
any further discussions about arms control in
space. Important, and not to be dismissed, issues
that would require serious and difficult
negotiations include the feasibility of a sweeping
ban on conventional space weapons and the
verification of compliance. It should also be
noted that states will only sign treaties if it is in
their best interest and if doing so will result in a
net security gain. It is to be hoped that an
increase in shared exploration, monitoring,
perceived mutual interests, and security and
stability in space will lead states to the conclusion
that breaking the space weapons taboo would be a
step backward. Thus, our approach to the issue of
weapons bans is to see that possibility only as a
follow-on to establishing the necessary
foundation of peaceful norms, behaviors and
practices, rather than a first step toward achieving
space security.

America’s Leadership Role
This article sets out elements of a possible
framework for ensuring long-term security in
space in a manner that would support and even
improve U.S. national security and global space
security. The central core of our concept is the
belief that it is critical to protect reliable access to
and use of space for commercial, civil, and
military actors around the world, and make way
for new actors as well, so that humankind can
continue to benefit from the life-saving services
provided and the knowledge gained by space
assets.
This framework relies on the
establishment of norms of behavior, best
practices, and rules of law. It is arguably the case
that the technology revolution of the past two
decades as applied to the use of space has
outstripped the normative and legal instruments
set up primarily during the 1960s. Space is too
important to allow a kind of Wild West situation
to evolve (or perhaps devolve) among space
actors. Unfortunately, the present rhetoric in the
United States that emphasizes a strategy of space
dominance and control – and ultimately war
fighting “in, from, and through space” – is fueling
tensions rather than dampening them. We believe
that the United States instead should be a leader,
as it traditionally has been here on Earth, in
developing and applying behavioral norms and
the rule of law in space. And the time for
embracing such a leadership role is now, before
the negative trends toward competition and
conflict in space accelerate and the situation
becomes much more complicated and difficult to
address. It is our hope that a broadening and
deepening of the current debate about space
weaponization among policy makers, military
leaders, lawmakers, and the public will establish a
better understanding of the requirements for
space security, and the criticality of ensuring a
stable and peaceful space environment for all
actors. No one can own space, and neither can
any one be safe in space without ensuring the
safety of all.
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As U.S. space capability came of age in the early
1960s it made substantive arms control negotiations
possible. Arms control proponents like to argue that
treaties, in turn, legitimated spy satellites by
acknowledging their existence and sanctioning their
use for verification. But the half-century old
relationship between satellite technology and arms
control has hardly been marked by such reciprocity.
While satellite technology has enabled arms control,
arms control has imposed nontrivial constraints on
America’s strategic exploitation of outer space. In
bureaucratic terms, Department of Defense (DOD)
exploitation of outer space has been retarded by
State Department instruments that were only
possible because of military exploitation of space.
That in itself is hardly novel. The military and
diplomatic instruments of American power are
notoriously uncongenial partners. The bureaucratic
orientations of State and Defense are governed by
differing, often hostile habits of thought. They
represent domestic and international networks with
political, indeed partisan, characteristics. Each has a
global footprint and a crisis management perspective
that frequently negates the perspective of the other.
Moreover, the two bureaucratic cultures tend to
perceive policy options in either-or terms. When
challenges arise abroad, this cultural bifurcation
typically casts U.S. response options in mutually
exclusive terms: will the U.S. response be military
or diplomatic – as if the zero-sum nature the
“choice” were an eternal verity.

Must it always be so? What if diplomacy designed
space-related international regimes to enhance the
security of U.S. satellites and the integrity of their
vital data streams? What if the resultant American
freedom of action in outer space were employed not
just in compliance with such a framework but in
enforcement of it? What if the two processes could
rise above their zero-sum traditions and actually
supplement one another? In fact, such a strategic
partnership is both possible and necessary – possible
because diplomacy and space control share the
unambiguous common purpose of enhancing U.S.
national security; necessary because space control is
more than a military challenge. Because it also
involves civil, commercial, and diplomatic interests,
space policy must culminate in enforceable regimes
that take account of each.
The analogous
relationship between sea control and maritime law
demonstrates both the possibility and the necessity.
By outlawing repugnant activities like slave trading,
drug smuggling, and terrorism on the high seas,1
maritime law establishes the very frame of reference
from which naval rules of engagement begin. The
law’s jurisdictional protocols, identification
1

“High seas” is a legal term of art for international
waters. National sovereignty extends 12 miles from a
nation’s shores according to the UN Law of the Sea.
Certain environmental protection and national security
rights extend to a 200-mile limit under the 1958 Geneva
Convention. Thus, it is commonly understood that the high
seas, over which sovereignty may not be claimed, begin
beyond the 200-mile limit.
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procedures, and signals of purpose and intent tell
coast guards and navies when and how to act.
Falsely flagged or unflagged vessels can be hailed,
interrogated, boarded, seized, disabled, or even
destroyed. Flagged ships in U.S. territorial waters
must be aided if they are in distress and may be
challenged only under specified circumstances. The
diplomatic and military instruments of U.S. power
thereby interact to the benefit of both toward a
common strategic purpose.
This relationship, so deeply embedded in maritime
history and tradition, is not presently mirrored in
the realm of outer space, and indeed that is the first
challenge that space control proponents must face.
One obstacle will be the longstanding bifurcation of
space assets between those classified for national
security purposes and those that perform
conventional or nonmilitary missions. The former
has included reconnaissance satellites since the day
President Eisenhower defined the two mission areas
as separate. In 1958, when Eisenhower
compartmentalized spy satellites and fostered
creation of the United Nations (UN) Committee on
the Peaceful Use of Outer Space, the United States
faced a single strategically closed adversary who
was demonstrably capable of manipulating foreign
images of its strength or weakness. Understandably,
strategists under these conditions elevated strategic
information – the capacity to observe an otherwise
opaque threat – to the tier of U.S. interests ranked as
vital. But that judgment held sway when U.S. space
assets were physically beyond the reach of
technology and their physical protection therefore
less urgent.
Eisenhower’s “Peaceful Uses of Space” policy
spawned national and international institutions,
which spawned space law agreements that are now a
half century old. Recognizing the constructive
achievements of sea law, these early instruments of
space law emulated their predecessors’ founding
principles. Like the premise that all nations share
the right to transit the high seas peacefully, for
example, the 1967 Outer Space Treaty assigns
international status to outer space. Just as flagging
laws tell civil and military authorities whose laws

will prosecute illegal maritime behavior, space
outlaws are subject to the laws of the state from
which they embarked. In both cases the violators
relinquish their entitlement to protection from any
state.
But if the sea-space analogy can be sustained in
regard to the premises of law, it fails catastrophically
when the discussion turns to the enforcement of
law. What if an acknowledged space crime cannot
be traced to a given state or to a state party to the
Outer Space Treaty? True, the space law violator
would still be subject to after the fact enforcement
measures just as maritime criminals can be
prosecuted upon return to port. But punishment
after-the-fact is universally recognized inadequate in
regard to sea law, which aims to negate the
consequences if not the act itself before its effects
are achieved. While prosecution after-the-fact may
be conceivable in the case of outer space law, the
instruments of crime prevention are neither in place
nor under serious discussion. The resultant capacity
differential suggests that peaceful behavior is
strategically less important in outer space than at
sea.
Since that has become an impossible
proposition to defend, the rationale for capacity
differential must lie in the non-strategic realm.
To achieve the space control objectives outlined by
each of the past five
the sea-space administrations, space
analogy fails strategy must include
enforcement measures
catastrophically that
include
when discussion prevention
and
turns to negation of effects as
enforcement well as after-the-fact
of law punishment. To the
extent that the sea
control analogy is
useful, however, it must be international law that is
enforced, not just national strategy. But that will be
possible only if the law is structured in support of
strategy and vice versa. That approach to space
strategy will require a holistic outlook that takes
account of the diplomatic perspective instead of the
narrow view that frames each issue in either-or
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terms. For either perspective to be relevant the
framework must be oriented toward the
advancement of what is clearly a vital U.S. national
security requirement – secure access to and freedom
of action in outer space.
Space Technology’s
Contribution to Arms Control
Arms control was a largely academic exercise in the
service of U.S. public diplomacy before the first
successful Corona satellite mission in 1960. The
most militant Cold War U.S. national security policy
ever articulated – NSC-68 in 1950 – began with the
straightforward presumption that the American
people would insist “that the free world be
continuously prepared to negotiate agreements with
the Soviet Union on equitable terms.”2 Presidents
Truman, Eisenhower, and Kennedy struggled
mightily to reconcile that political reality with Soviet
disdain for any agreement that would advance U.S.
security. A central ingredient of that bilateral
dynamic – from an operational as well as a public
relations standpoint – was therefore “verification.”
There
were
two
problems with this analysts could
model.
First, only extrapolate
verification was not the from what they
real impediment. As
knew of German
long as the Union of
Soviet
Socialist and U.S. ballistic
Republics
(USSR) missile programs
defined itself as the
“antithesis” of the
postwar international status quo, Soviet leaders
could hardly accept legal arrangements designed to
institutionalize a secure western industrial order. To
do so would cast doubt on the communist regime’s
already questionable claims to legitimacy. Second,
any U.S. effort to negotiate in the face of that reality
would encounter an operational challenge that was
2

S. Nelson Drew, ed., NSC-68: Forging the Strategy of
Containment (Washington, D.C.: NDU Press, 1994), pp.
76-80.

related to verification. Soviet negotiators would
arrive at a negotiating table fully informed on a
bilateral balance of power that was still subject to
wide speculation in the West. That would be
disadvantageous under any conditions, but Soviet
negotiators would also represent a government that
was both organized and inclined to conduct
orchestrated
campaigns
of
clandestine
noncompliance.
Theory had it that this gaping chasm between a
constitutionally open and a strategically closed
society could be bridged if monitoring provisions
allowed U.S. observation of Soviet compliance.
Efforts to construct such a bridge from 1945 to 1965
were as creative as they were futile. Truman’s 1946
Baruch Plan3 made a unilateral U.S. nuclear
disarmament proposal contingent upon Soviet
acceptance of international inspection rights.
Eisenhower offered the Soviets blueprints of
American defense facilities, access to American
airfields, and unimpeded overflight rights using any
collection equipment needed, if they would accept
his 1955 “Open Skies” proposal.4 Kennedy tabled
one on-site inspection proposal after another at the
UN’s Eighteen Nation Disarmament Commission.
Each was unequivocally rejected.
In truth, the pre-Corona U.S. national security
dilemma involved a threat assessment challenge
what was far more fundamental than the verification
challenge. The intelligence community (IC) knew
in the mid-1950s of an energetic Soviet
intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) research
and development (R&D) program, but had “no firm
current intelligence on what particular guided
missiles the USSR is presently developing or may
3

Bernard M. Baruch, 14 June 1946, UN Atomic Energy
Commission. U.S. Department of State Bulletin, 23 June
1946, “Proposals for an International Atomic Development
Authority.”
4
Statement by President Eisenhower at the Geneva
Conference of Heads of Government: Aerial Inspection and
Exchange of Military Blueprints, 21 July 1955. The
Geneva Conference of Heads of Government, July 18-23,
1955 (Department of State publication 6046, 1955), pp. 5659. Documents on Disarmament, 1954-1959, pp. 486-492.
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now have in operational use.” To estimate the
missile threat, analysts could only extrapolate from
what they knew of German and U.S. ballistic missile
programs and Soviet progress in other fields. These
indirect indicators, paired with speculation on Soviet
intentions, were all that underpinned threat
projections. As a result, the 1954 National
Intelligence Estimate (NIE) would acknowledge that
“estimates of missile characteristics and of dates of
missile availability must be considered as only
tentative, and as representing our best assessment in
light of inadequate evidence in a new and largely
unexplored field.”5
Conditions would change little through the
remainder of the decade. Years of clandestine
reconnaissance overflights,6 including the U-2
program beginning in 1956, provided the IC with
piecemeal imagery of Soviet deployments, but
“insufficient direct evidence to establish the scale
and pace of the present Soviet ICBM production and
deployment program….” Through 1960, NIEs
would rely “on various indirect forms of evidence
and on argument and analysis deduced from more
general considerations.”
The data were so
ambiguous that the Air Force could predict 150
Soviet ICBMs by mid-1961 and 700 by mid-1963,
while the Army and Navy were estimating 50 and
200 respectively with the State Department splitting
the difference.7

5

“NIE 11-6-54: Soviet Capabilities and Probable
Programs in the Guided Missile Field,” in Donald Steury
ed., Estimates on Soviet Military Power, 1954 to 1984,
(Washington, D.C.: Center for the Study of Intelligence,
1996).
6
For a partial account of U.S. Cold War reconnaissance
missions, see Robert L. Goldrich, “Cold War Shoot-Down
Incidents Involving U.S. Military Aircraft Resulting in US
Casualties,” Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division,
Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, July
1992.
7
“NIE 11-8-60: Soviet Capabilities and Probable
Programs in the Guided Missile Field,” Donald Steury,
Intentions and Capabilities: Estimates on Soviet Strategic
Forces, 1950 to 1983,” (Washington, D.C.: Center for the
Study of Intelligence, 1996).

The U.S. arms control agenda of those years
involved highly publicized proposals and dialogues,
none of which addressed deployed weapons.
Grandiose discussions of mutual disarmament and
comprehensive nuclear test bans became
commonplace while serious discussion was
constrained to modest limits on proliferation, testing
in the atmosphere and in space, and rules of the road
for uncontested regions like Antarctica and the
seabed. Ostensibly, discussion of actual weapons
was prohibited because the United States could not
verify Soviet compliance, and because no Soviet
interest was served by removing that obstacle.
Disclosure of the more fundamental impediment –
that the IC was too blind to conduct garden-variety
national security threat assessments – would hardly
have advanced U.S. public diplomacy goals.
The latter problem would change dramatically in
August of 1960 when the fourteenth Corona
mission, carrying Discoverer 14, made seventeen
passes over Soviet and East European territory.8
President Eisenhower and Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA) Director Allen Dulles gaped in
amazement as photographs developed from sixteen
pounds of recovered film were delivered to the oval
office. That mission alone showed the President
more coverage than all prior U-2 flights combined.
The 1.5 million square miles of scanned territory
revealed tanks, submarines, bombers, ICBMs, 64 air
bases, and 26 surface-to-air missile (SAM) sites.9
According to Bud Wheelon, who later directed the
Corona Program, for policy makers and intelligence
analysts, “it was as if an enormous floodlight had
been turned on in a darkened warehouse.” Indeed,
8

The date of the first capsule’s recovery, 18 August
1960, was the same day U-2 pilot Frances Gary Powers was
sentenced in Moscow for piloting the last U-2 flight ever
flown over the USSR. The “Discoverer 14” nomenclature
would be retroactively changed to comport with the “KH”
system when the Talent-Keyhole program was instituted.
See Dwayne A. Day, John M. Logsdon, and Brian Latell,
eds., Eye in the Sky; The Story of the Corona Spy Satellites
(Washington: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1998), p. 6.
9
William E. Burrows, “Imaging Space Reconnaissance
Operations during the Cold War: Cause, Effect and
Legacy,” in The Cold War Experience, the Cold War
Website, p. 5.
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Corona would quickly acquire the “decisive
technology” status once reserved for World War II
Enigma intercepts.10 Suddenly, the 1961 NIE would
differ markedly from those that preceded it:
Through KEYHOLE photography over the
past three months, we have positively
identified three ICBM complexes under
construction. Two are near Yur’ya and
Yoshkar-Ola, in a region several hundred
miles northeast of Moscow, and the third is
near Verkhnyaya Salda in the Urals. The
paired, road-served pads at those complexes
closely resemble those at Tyuratam Area C.
Near Kostroma, in the same general region
but closer to Moscow, the photography
revealed a new clearing suitable for a pair of
pads, and we believe this is possibly a fourth
complex similar to the others.11 …[This] new
information, providing a much firmer base for
estimates on Soviet long-range ballistic
missiles, has caused a sharp downward
revision in our estimate of Soviet ICBM
strength…. We now estimate that the present
Soviet ICBM strength is in the range of 10-25
launchers from which missiles can be fired
against the United States, and that this force
level will not increase markedly during the
months immediately ahead.12
Over and over the USSR had surprised American
governments – from Stalin’s provocative foreign
policy speech of 1946, to the atomic bomb test of
1949, to the hydrogen bomb test of 1953, to the
ICBM and Sputnik launches of 1957. Each had
caught the United States off guard. In combination
with a bellicose foreign policy and a drumbeat of
hostile public diplomacy, these surprises achieved
10

Albert D. Wheelon, “CORONA, A Triumph of
American Technology,” Day, Logsdon, and Latell, eds.,
Eye in the Sky, p. 38.
11
Kevin C. Ruffner, Corona: America’s First Satellite
Program, (Washington, D.C.: Center for the Study of
Intelligence, 1995), p. 137.
12
“NIE 11-8/11-61: Strength and Deployment of Soviet
Long-Range Ballistic Missile Forces,” Steury, ed.,
Intentions and Capabilities.

their intended effect of keeping the United States in
a state of perpetual anxiety. Corona had, for all
intents and purposes, ushered in the end of that era.
A window had been opened on the opaque threat.
Soviet overstatements about producing ICBMs “like
sausages” would no longer manipulate U.S. anxiety
levels. On threat cognizance grounds alone, space
reconnaissance had permitted the national security
community to exhale with relief for the first time
since 1945.
As anticipated in NSC-68, the U.S. policy
community could not employ such a breakthrough
as an exclusive tool of threat assessment. It was true
that reliable, unilaterally controlled means of
intelligence collection had altered the strategic
landscape. It was also true that such transparency
had diminished the unilateral risk of an open society
negotiating with a militant, hostile, strategically
closed adversary. Before the emergence of space
reconnaissance the United States did not even know
enough about the balance of power to specify the
content of negotiations. But within a few short years
of Discoverer 14, American Strategic Arms
Limitation Talks (SALT) negotiators would specify
both sides’ force levels to Soviet counterparts who
remained silent on the matter. This was necessary
both because the USSR had no intention of sharing
such information and because the Soviet
representations of their own force levels would have
meant little. Red Army officials on the Soviet
delegation would protest privately to their U.S.
counterparts, in fact, for revealing too much
information about Soviet forces in the presence of
their civilian counterparts.
Beyond verification, space reconnaissance had
defined the limits and possibilities of arms control’s
very substance. Thus, SALT I would equate ICBMs
with silos and Submarine-Launched Ballistic
Missiles (SLBMs) with tubes on ballistic missile
submarines. Nor were these definitions based on the
threat implications of these components. The
relationship between “weapons,” in threat
assessment terms, and “units of account,” in arms
control terms, would be asserted based on what
could be seen and counted by “national technical
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means” (NTM). Thus, the ABM Treaty would limit
only deployed interceptors and launchers. The fact
that large phased array radars (LPARs) were
operationally essential long lead-time components
of an ABM system, though helpful in threat
assessment terms, was an afterthought in arms
control terms.13
Although space sensors would prove at least as
valuable in practice as in theory from a threat
cognizance standpoint, the same cannot be said
about their contributions to verification. This is not
because the product is more informative for the
former than for the latter, but because observation is
not the same as detection and monitoring is not the
same as verifying. Overhead sensors can observe
and monitor, but only policy makers can reach the
political judgments required to
only policy detect and verify. Although
makers can enhanced threat awareness
reach the would certainly strengthen
U.S. confidence in arms
political control, none of the
judgments subsequent
Cold
War
required to compliance
controversies
would
have
been
better
detect and
by
better
verify informed
monitoring. To say that space
reconnaissance
“enabled”
arms control is therefore an understatement, but the
reasons for this go well beyond just its role in
verification.
The first actual application of space-based NTM to
arms control verification was the 1963 Limited Test
13

President Johnson approved formal instructions to the
U.S. SALT delegation calling for an offensive and
defensive “freeze” to be presented as a single
comprehensive entity. The instructions were “drawn up on
the assumption that in each instance we could agree to
exclusive reliance on national means of verification.” The
ABM portion of the proposal would address ABM
interceptors and launchers, but not radars. See
Memorandum from the President’s Special Assistant
(Rostow) to President Johnson, 29 August 1968. Document
277. Johnson collection, Department of State Website. Tab
B to this document, “Strategic Missile Talks Basic Position
Paper” instructs the SALT delegation.

Ban Treaty, which relied on Vela satellites’ infrared
detection technology to identify atmospheric nuclear
events. But reliance on space-based reconnaissance
for verification also began in earnest just a few years
after the first successful Corona launch. In what
looked at the time like another in a series of
innocuous U.S. proposals, Lyndon Johnson
proposed “five major types of potential agreement”
in a 1964 address to the Eighteen Nation
Disarmament Committee. One of these would
“endeavor to agree to explore a verified freeze of the
number and characteristics of strategic nuclear
offensive and defensive vehicles.”14
Arriving
alongside Secretary of Defense McNamara’s mutual
vulnerability doctrine, the proposal would quickly
acquire traction. Within six months there would be
open discussion within the administration of using
intelligence to support verification. Soon a
consensus would form by which intelligence might
be enough by itself to evaluate Soviet declarations of
existing launchers.15 By the end of 1964 the NSC
would be actively contemplating a freeze on ICBM,
SLBM, and ABM launchers verified exclusively “by
our respective national capabilities…”16
The State Department would have embraced this
idea under almost any conditions, but with
McNamara’s Pentagon on board it would gain
momentum quickly. The only holdout among
relevant Executive Branch agencies would be the
14

Message from President Johnson to the Eighteen
Nation Disarmament Committee, 21 January 1964,
Documents on Disarmament, 1964 (Washington, D.C.,
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency), p. 8.
15
Memorandum of Conversation, 16 June 1964, Subject:
Verification of Freeze …Discussed by the Committee of
Principals. Document 36, Johnson collection, Department
of State Website.
16
Memorandum from the Ambassador at Large
(Thompson) to the Acting Director of the Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency (Fisher), 28 November 1964.
Subject: ACDA’s Six-Point Suggested Program to Prevent
Nuclear Proliferation. Document 52, Johnson collection,
Department of State Website. Note: Document’s
accompanying reference material includes a 23 November
1964 Memorandum from ACDA Director Foster to the
Committee of Principals outlining “a renewed and broadly
based effort to prevent nuclear proliferation.” The fourth of
Foster’s six proposals is referenced here.
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Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), which “held that any
arms control agreement should provide for adequate
verification other than by complete reliance on
unilateral intelligence.17 But the JCS had grown
accustomed to being overruled by McNamara on
more pressing issues – such as conduct of war in
Vietnam – and less than a week after this statement
the State Department would signal to Soviet leaders
that
The US would be prepared to discuss the
possibilities of placing maximum reliance on
unilateral means of verification to meet the
major objectives of ceasing further
deployment of new missile and anti-missile
launch facilities without requiring inspection
on either party’s territory.18
Weeks later, President Johnson would lay
groundwork for public acceptance of this approach
with seemingly offhand remarks to a group of
educators in Nashville:
We’ve spent $35-40 billion on the space
program, and if nothing else had come out of
it except the knowledge we’ve gained from
space photography, it would be worth ten
times what the whole program cost. Because
tonight we know how many missiles the
enemy has and, it turned out, our guesses
were way off. We were doing things we
didn’t need to do. We were building things
we didn’t need to build. We were harboring
fears we didn’t need to harbor.19
By the end of 1967, the IC itself would confirm
“very substantial, though of course not unlimited,
17

Memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to
Secretary of Defense McNamara, JCSM-30-67; 19 January
1967. Subject: Questions Relating to a Possible Freeze
Agreement on Strategic Forces. Document 176 Johnson
collection, Department of State Website.
18
Telegram from Department of State to the Embassy in
the Soviet Union, 22 January 1967. Document 179 Johnson
collection, Department of State Website.
19
“Satellite Spying Cited by Johnson,” New York Times,
17 March 1967.

capabilities for unilateral verification of measures
along lines now being considered for a strategic
launcher freeze.”20 Before leaving office in January
1969 the Johnson Administration had solidly
coalesced behind a proposal for a unilaterally
verified freeze on offensive and defensive launchers
– a going-in position that did not even include ABM
radars.21 The Administration had even agreed to
refer to overhead reconnaissance systems as
national (rather than unilateral or external) technical
means of verification.22 On these grounds the Soviet
Government would agree to a 30 September venue
at which the United States would have tabled this
proposal if the August 1968 Soviet Czechoslovakian

20

From a reference to Special NIE 11-10-67 in Telegram
From Department of State to Embassy in the Soviet Union,
15 February 1967. Document 181, Johnson collection,
Department of State Website.
21
Comments recorded at a Principals Meeting on 22
August 1968 confirm this point. In the course of
discussions on how to ban Soviet upgrade of the Tallinn air
defense system, for example, Secretary of State Rusk
pointed out that, “at the JCS’ recommendation, we were not
limiting radars.” Responding to a comment that the Tallinn
system was of little value without new radars, Navy
Secretary Nitze “agreed, but said we were not stopping
radars.” See Record of Meeting of the Executive
Committee of the Committee of Principals, ACDA-3024,
Document 275, Johnson collection, Department of State
Website.
22
Dialogue at the 22 August 1968 Principals Committee
meeting referenced above: “[National Security Advisor
Walt] Rostow suggested that a word be picked, and then the
delegation establish a legislative record in the talks with the
Soviets on the meaning of the word, including reference to
observations from satellites. [Acting ACDA Director] Mr.
Foster pointed out that the Soviets might object to any
formal understanding on this point, although they had
already agreed tacitly. Mr. Rostow thought that in this
critical case it might be desirable to get a formal
understanding. Secretary Clifford stated a preference for
either ‘unilateral’ or ‘national’ over the word ‘external,’
which had been agreed upon at the last meeting. Secretary
Rusk said he was quite willing to return to the term
‘national’ and that it might be useful to have an explanation
of the meaning of the term… Summary of Actions 1: It was
agreed that hereafter the term ‘national’ means of
verification would be used in place of ‘unilateral’ or
‘external.”
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intervention had not put the entire process on hold.23
With this groundwork in place the Nixon
Administration would take office in 1969 and
complete negotiation of the Interim Offensive
Agreement and the ABM Treaty.
Arms Control’s Contributions to Space Control
At least initially, the Soviets would object
vociferously to the proposition of uncontested U.S.
reconnaissance over their national territory. Within
days of the first successful Corona launch, a Soviet
journalist would correctly name the highly classified
Corona, Samos, and Midas programs, labeling them
“illegal espionage satellites.” Such “American plans
of space espionage [were] incompatible with the
generally recognized principles and rules of
international law,” and the USSR had “everything
necessary to paralyze U.S. military espionage both
in the air and in outer space.”24
By now, of course, the United States was
accustomed to such overstatements from the
Khrushchev regime and confident that its Corona
satellites were deployed in orbits beyond the reach
of Soviet denial capability, at least for the time being
– a fait accompli that significantly multiplied their
strategic value. Still, for the Soviets to challenge the
satellites’ compatibility with “generally recognized
principles and rules of international law” was hard to
ignore. An American U-2 pilot captured in 1960
had gone on trial in Moscow on 18 August – the
very day of the first Corona capsule’s recovery.
Publicly humbled by the downing of a prima fascia
American spy plane, Eisenhower would be hard
pressed to explain the legal distinction between
endo- and exo-atmospheric intrusions to the
American public. Even if the Soviets could not
currently intercept the Discoverer series’ elliptical
23
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polar flight path, their assertion of the right to do so
framed the issue in terms more dependent on
technology and orbital dynamics than on the legality
of overflight.
Eisenhower’s emphasis on secrecy, civil space
missions, and “peaceful use of space” diplomacy,
would be driven in large measure by these
unresolved legal questions until the Soviets
launched their own reconnaissance satellite on 26
April 1962.25 Legal tensions diminished a bit further
in 1963 when a UN Resolution set forth the basic
components of international space law.26 The 1972
Interim Offensive Agreement and ABM Treaty –
SALT I – would then apply these legalities to NTM
providing that:
1. For the purpose of providing assurance of
compliance with the provisions of this Treaty,
each Party shall use national technical means
of verification at its disposal in a manner
consistent with the generally recognized
principles of international law.
2. Each Party undertakes not to interfere with
the national technical means of verification of
the other Party operating in accordance with
paragraph 1 of this Article.

25

The Zenit vehicle – called “Cosmos 4” for cover –
would be placed on orbit with the same R-7 booster and
Vostok capsule that carried Yuri Gargarin to space 12 July
1961. Its four-day mission would deliver 10-15 meter
resolutions. Burrows, “Imaging Space Reconnaissance
Operations during the Cold War,” p. 12.
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Resolution 1962 (XVIII), Declaration of Legal
Principles Governing the Activities of States in the
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would serve as a precursor to the Treaty On Principles
Governing The Activities Of States In The Exploration And
Use Of Outer Space, Including The Moon And Other
Celestial Bodies (The Outer Space Treaty: Signed at
Washington, London, Moscow, 27 January 1967,
Ratification advised by U.S. Senate 25 April 1967, Ratified
by U.S. President 24 May 1967). The latter Treaty
provided that space exploration be carried out for the
benefit of all countries irrespective of their degree of
development, and sought to maintain outer space as the
province of all mankind free for exploration and use by all
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3. Each Party undertakes not to use deliberate
concealment measures which impede
verification by national technical means of
compliance with the provisions of this
Treaty.27
After
space
reconnaissance had international law
enabled
arms does serve purposes
control, it would be dismissed by critics,
pleasantly
and is burdened by
symmetrical to say enforcement
that these arms problems obscured
control provisions,
in turn, facilitated by proponents
the free utilization
of outer space. While outer space assets arguably
acquired a measure of increased legitimacy,
however, the reality is less dramatic. The USSR had
no choice but to live with intrusive space
reconnaissance in 1972 and as their technology
matured over the next few years these agreements
would not stand in the way of weapons that could
negate U.S. assets. But if this article’s purpose were
to challenge the enforceability of international law,
it would begin not by questioning arms control’s
“legalization of NTM,” but with prior questions
about whether national security can be achieved
through negotiation at all. In fact international law
does serve purposes dismissed by critics, and is
burdened by enforcement problems obscured by
proponents. Because treaty law involves a complex
array of legal, diplomatic, and political
technicalities, its specialists tend to be treaty
proponents who embellish the “mutually reinforcing
partnership” between “monitoring” for arms control,
and “intelligence” for threat assessment. This is an
27

Article XII, Treaty Between The United States Of
America And The Union Of Soviet Socialist Republics On
The Limitation Of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (ABM
Treaty), Signed at Moscow 26 May 1972, Ratification
advised by U.S. Senate 3 August 1972, Ratified by U.S.
President 30 September 1972. Identical language used in
Article V, Interim Agreement between the United States of
America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on
Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of
Strategic Offensive Arms – an Executive Agreement signed
in Moscow 26 May 1972.

important point, however, because if treaties can
enhance the security of U.S. assets in space, then
space control strategists ought to be their strongest
supporters.
Let us grant that, given a choice between obscurity
and clarity, it is better from a strategic standpoint if
U.S. space assets are viewed as clearly legitimate.
Additionally, let us stipulate that arms control’s
“NTM” euphemism includes spy satellites and other
technical collection assets. Using the NTM
language of the ABM Treaty as a baseline, real
world cases still permit the following fundamental
generalizations:
•

These provisions’ stated purpose was to
provide “assurance of compliance with the
provisions of this Treaty,” not to sanction
NTM’s observation of noncompliance, or of
activities not explicitly addressed in the
treaty.

•

Interference with NTM was prohibited, but
only when NTM was “providing assurance of
compliance with the provisions of this
Treaty.”

•

The only deliberate concealment prohibited
was that which would “impede verification of
compliance with the provisions of this
Treaty.”

•

The provisions never specified what NTM
encompassed, indicated how the parties could
distinguish between use of NTM for
verification and other intelligence activities,
or addressed what could be done legally if the
offended party determined that activities were
not NTM verification.

Before these provisions were agreed to in 1972, of
course, there were far fewer grounds on which to
call space based collection assets legal. Indeed,
when the U-2 was shot down over Soviet territory in
1960, the first U.S. reaction was to publicly deny
that it was a spy plane, and Soviet proof to the
contrary was a major diplomatic embarrassment.
Still, for arms control proponents to say that these
agreements legalized space based intelligence
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collection – even as it related strictly to arms control
– was overstated and self-promotional. To illustrate,
consider the case histories of two relatively
insignificant real world U.S. compliance issues of
the mid-1970s:28
•

•

In 1974, the United States observed a
substantial increase in the concealment of
Soviet strategic weapons programs. Though
presumably foreclosed by SALT I’s nonconcealment provisions, a charge of violation
would have required proof that “these
measures
prevented
verification
of
compliance with agreed provisions.” Rather
than facing that obstacle, U.S. policy makers
dropped the issue altogether noting that “there
no longer appeared to be an expanding pattern
of concealment activities associated with
strategic weapons programs.”
In 1975, the United States analyzed Soviet
actions alleged to have “blinded” U.S.
reconnaissance satellites – a practice
seemingly foreclosed by SALT I’s
noninterference provisions. This too was
deemed compliant on grounds that U.S.
monitoring capability related to the
agreement’s provisions “had not been
affected by these events.”

Beyond the questionable security afforded U.S.
space assets by arms control measures, the treaties
that refer to NTM are bilateral ones between the
United States and USSR. At least a dozen states,
many of whom are openly hostile to U.S. interests,
are now capable of accessing outer space. In this
context it is worth recalling that the multilateral
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) – for
which U.S. Senate advice and consent was denied in
1999 – relied not on national technical means but on
an internationally controlled seismic network.
Indeed, a number of states, led by China, resisted

28
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provisions that would sanction national intelligence
sources.29 As China’s representative put it:
On the issue of national technical means
(NTM), China had consistently opposed in the
past two years and more the concept of
allowing NTMs to play a role in the CTBT
verification regime, particularly in triggering
of on-site inspections.30
Eventually, in what it described as “a major
concession,” China would grant allowance for
“purely technical NTMs to play a supplementary
role.” Thus, inspection requests could appeal to
NTM only if they specified “all data upon which the
request is based” thereby exposing sources and
methods of collection. Even then, the political
decision to act on such a request would rely
exclusively on international data.
The fact that space assets have been in common use
by a variety of states for four decades probably earns
29

The question at hand was whether NTM could be used
to trigger complex provisions related to on-site inspections
(OSI) of suspect activities. A demand for inspection (which
would be tightly managed by the suspected state) required
31 votes on the 50-member CTBT Executive Committee.
Paragraphs 5, Section A, of Article IV of the CTBT
specifies a monitoring regime consisting of international
seismic stations, consultations, on-site inspections (OSI),
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The Administration’s Article-by-Article Analysis
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verifying Treaty compliance…” but that paragraph 37 of
Section D of Article IV allows OSI requests based on
NTM. Paragraph 37 of Section D of Article IV allows use
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pursuant to Part II, paragraph 41 of the Protocol.”
Paragraph 41 of the Protocol, Part II, provides that OSI
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Statement by H. E. Mr. Sha Zukang, Ambassador of
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Disarmament, at the Plenary Meeting of the CD, 1 August
1996. Transcript from PRC Permanent Mission at Geneva.
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them more legal stature than they can acquire
through formal law. But in the final analysis, with
or without law, the assets we call “NTM” are
operated by intelligence services for clandestine
espionage purposes. Their effectiveness is enhanced
not by the genuineness of the other side’s approval,
but by the other side’s ignorance of when and how
they are operating. Most states will do all they can
to disallow espionage intrusions at times and places
of a curious observer’s choosing. Decisions of
whether or not to negate such intrusions may be
affected by extant international standards, but, as
shown, those standards are conditional. The same
qualifiers that limit well-intended noninterference
and non-concealment provisions will apply, at the
offended state’s discretion, to choices of whether to
negate any intelligence collection activities it
regards as offensive.
Clearly then,
beyond arms control’s
arms
limited positive
control’s
contributions to U.S.
NTM
freedom of action in outer
provisions
apply not to space, several of its
overhead
provisions simply
technical
foreclose U.S. strategic
collection in
general, but options
to its narrowly limited use in support of specific
arms control provisions, and primarily in a bilateral
context. In other words, arms control has advanced
the interests of – at most – arms control. Proponents
are thereby equipped to defend a treaty’s
verifiability on grounds that intelligence garnered
therefrom will be “admissible.” But the record
demonstrates that how behaviors are categorized,
what standards of evidence will apply, and the
nature of proof itself are all political issues. Thus,
even to the extent that it relates to arms control,
NTM legalization contributes little or nothing to
U.S. freedom of action in outer space.
Beyond arms control’s limited positive contributions
to U.S. freedom of action in outer space, several of
its provisions simply foreclose U.S. strategic
options. Some – like the Outer Space Treaty’s

prohibition of weapons of mass destruction on orbit
– impede no strategic options of immediate interest
to the United States. Others – like the ABM
Treaty’s prohibition of U.S. territorial defense, or “a
base for such a defense” against ballistic missiles –
have been of more immediate concern.31 Although
the treaty permitted limited ABM testing, the United
States explicitly agreed in 1972 “not to develop, test,
or deploy ABM systems or components which are
…space-based….”32
That provision outlawed
specific, vitally important U.S. options for the
strategic exploitation of outer space. In the real
world, a broader extra-legal ABM Treaty regime
featured a plethora of self-imposed political
restrictions that limited U.S. freedom of action far
beyond the treaty’s explicit terms.
One example of a self-imposed constraint on U.S.
space
exploitation
involves
the
“broad
interpretation” debate over the ABM Treaty’s
testing restrictions. The issue first arose in 1985
when the Defense Department realized that for all of
its restrictions on research and development the
treaty had left open the door to testing space-based
ballistic missile defense (BMD) components that
employed “other physical principles.”33 At DOD’s
request, State Department Legal Affairs Advisor
Abraham Soafer had analyzed the treaty language,
intent, and negotiating record, and ruled that such
latitude had been left in the treaty – at Soviet
insistence despite U.S. efforts to restrict future
technologies.34 Had the Soviets exercised these
31
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33
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rights themselves, in other words, the U.S.
compliance adjudication machinery would almost
certainly have ruled it permissible. After National
Security Advisor Robert McFarlane aired this
interpretation in a televised news interview on 6
October 1985,35 news reports described a
contentious high-level interagency conflict over the
issue.
While legal experts in the State, Defense and
Justice Departments had accepted the
Pentagon
interpretation
even
before
McFarlane spoke, U.S. diplomats and [North
Atlantic Treaty Organization] NATO allies
were appalled. They protested that the
Administration position, coming only weeks
before next month’s Geneva summit meeting
between Reagan and Soviet Leader Mikhail
Gorbachev, would doom any chance for
negotiating an arms-control agreement.
[Secretary of State George] Shultz suggested
to the White House that if McFarlane were
making policy for so sensitive a matter on
television, then Reagan would seem to have
no need for a Secretary of State. Reagan
convened a White House meeting… described
by
Administration
sources
as
“acrimonious.”36
Despite his own legal advisor’s counsel, Shultz
publicly challenged McFarlane’s reading on three
grounds having nothing to do with treaty
provisions.37 First was “the outrageous way this
matter had been handled procedurally, which
Secretary of Defense Richard Perle. There was no doubt,
according to Kunsberg’s report, that the U.S. had sought a
tight ban on “exotic” future ABM systems except those in
fixed land-based mode, but that the Soviets had consistently
rejected the broad ban advocated by the United States. See
Don Oberdorfer, “ABM Reinterpretation: A Quick Study,”
Washington Post, 22 October 1985, A-1.
35
Interview with National Security Advisor Robert C.
McFarlane, Meet the Press, NBC-TV, 6 October 1985.
36
“Resolving a Star Wars Skirmish,” Time, 28 October
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37
George P. Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph; My Years as
Secretary of State (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons,
1993), pp. 580-1.

amounted to a usurpation of presidential authority.”
Second was Shultz’ view that it “was not the
traditional position of the United States or the
position of our allies; …and it was certainly at odds
with the current Soviet view.” While one might
question the relevance of these arguments, they were
political judgments well within the purview of a
Secretary of State. The third premise of Shultz’
opposition, however, was factually incorrect. Shultz
believed that because Reagan’s Strategic Defense
Initiative (SDI) “was a research program… we
could address the questions that we needed to
answer within the confines of the ABM Treaty.” In
truth, the “broad interpretation” would have vastly
expanded the United States right to test space-based
technologies most in need of testing. But Shultz
convinced himself that adherence to the traditional
“narrow” interpretation “would give us the best of
both worlds.”
We would be able to research the key
questions of strategic defense. We would also
have something to fall back on and to bargain
with by “clarifying” the treaty. So all this
flurry of concern could be made to be useful
to us.38
Since SDI space components did not require testing
by this State Department logic, the unarguably legal
U.S. right to do so could be traded for the State
Department’s more immediate diplomatic interests.
Speaking to a NATO audience one week after
38
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Treaty withdrawal rights for ten years. “In my view,
continued observance by the United States of the ABM
Treaty while offensive reductions took place would work to
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Congress had required Reagan and Weinberger to certify
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with the ABM Treaty. The notion that Shultz interpreted
this political assurance as a literal statement of
programmatic adequacy, whereby the Treaty was less than
a showstopper for SDI’s development program is, frankly,
shocking.
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McFarlane’s comments, Shultz would eagerly claim
victory in this bureaucratic battle:
It is our view, based on a careful analysis of
the treaty text and the negotiating record, that
a broader interpretation of our authority is
fully justified. This is, however, a moot point;
our SDI research program has been structured
and, as the President has reaffirmed last
Friday, will continue to be conducted in
accordance with a restrictive interpretation of
the treaty’s obligations. Furthermore, any
SDI deployment would be the subject of
consultations with our allies and to [sic]
discussion and negotiation, as appropriate,
with the Soviets in accordance with the terms
of the ABM Treaty.39
Shultz had apparently convinced the President to
adopt space-testing restrictions that were dictated, if
at all, by his reading of the “spirit” of the ABM
Treaty. In so doing, he unburdened the Soviets of
their greatest concern about the SDI program – U.S.
pursuit of advanced space based technologies. He
had also added consultation with allies and
negotiation with the Soviets to the preconditions of a
U.S. deployment decision, demanding nothing in
return.
Despite the conviction throughout the executive
branch that such latitude was legally in place, the
United States would never test a BMD component
under the broad interpretation of the treaty. A
political argument, intensified by internal
bureaucratic discord, had been resolved by extralegal criteria. Instead of expanding U.S. space
exploitation rights, McFarlane’s ploy had so
offended Shultz that it further restrained U.S.
strategic latitude. Meanwhile, in the Defense and
Space Talks (DST), where the two sides deliberated
such matters from 1985 to 1992, the Soviets would
39
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seek not just to ban research, development, and
testing of “space strike arms,” but also to confine all
other R&D to “the laboratory” – which would
proscribe the testing of even ground based ABM
components.
Soviet insistence that these restrictions must precede
a START agreement would outlive Ronald
Reagan’s Presidency. Congress would then codify
these political restrictions in the Missile Defense Act
(MDA) of 1991 which foreclosed a space layer of
ballistic missile defense, required Soviet approval of
essential non-space components, constrained
deployable technologies, discouraged R&D funding
for technologies that could not be legally deployed,
and unilaterally exorcised SDI’s global implications.
President Reagan had vetoed 1989 legislation
precisely because Congress had refused to authorize
his space interceptor program. But in September
1991 President Bush signaled the end of SDI’s
space component by signing the 1991 MDA into
law. As soon as Bush agreed to the START Treaty
on these grounds the Soviets vacated all discussion
of treaty revisions. Two years later Congress was
informed:
It is the position of the Clinton Administration
that
the
“narrow”
or
“traditional”
interpretation of the ABM Treaty is the
correct interpretation and, therefore, that the
ABM Treaty prohibits the development,
testing, and deployment of sea-based, airbased, space-based, or mobile land based
ABM systems and components without regard
to technology utilized.40
To further clarify its position the Clinton
Administration renamed the Strategic Defense
Initiative Organization (SDIO) as the Ballistic
Missile Defense Organization (BMDO). While
crediting SDI for helping to end the Cold War,
Secretary of Defense Les Aspin proclaimed “the end
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of the SDI decade.”41 In 1996 Clinton would veto
funding for the military space plane, the kinetic antisatellite (ASAT) program, and the Clementine II
asteroid probe, which simulated interception of
ballistic missiles in space.42 In 1997, he signed
agreements extending ABM Treaty restrictions on
strategic space exploitation to a prohibition on
“interceptors capable of intercepting theater missiles
from air or space.43
In short, although space technology and U.S. arms
control policy have shared an intimate relationship
since both came of age in the 1960s, the benefits of
that relationship have gone exclusively in the
direction of arms control. That substantive
agreements could be negotiated at all was
attributable to satellites’ contributions to threat
measurement. That such agreements could be called
verifiable was attributable to space assets’
monitoring precision. But beyond failure to
promote the security of satellites, arms control has
imposed binding legal and political restrictions on
U.S. space options with debilitating strategic
implications. The question to be answered is
whether that outcome could be reversed by diligent
application of diplomacy to the twenty-first century
strategic requirement for U.S. space control.
The Political Framework for Space Control
Wars and their component battles are won by those
who control the environment within which they are
fought. This is not a novel concept. Battle zone
control includes the governance of access and egress
by people, supplies, and equipment. Allied ground
forces could seize and hold territory in Iraq and
Afghanistan because the United States controlled the
air above them and the sea around them. Air and
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sea control are preconditions of terrestrial control,
which settles conflicts. From an operational military
standpoint “control” of outer space is no more or
less essential than control of other dimensions of the
battlespace environment.
This is offered not as a primer on the operational art,
but as a starting point for discussion of space control
in its proper context. The lay public understands
control as it relates to terrestrial, atmospheric, and
maritime lines of communication, but is less familiar
with the extension of these principles to outer space.
Exotic images associated with space control,
however illusory, are not lost on its detractors. It
does not mean ownership, sovereignty, occupation,
expropriation, perpetual domination, flags planted,
governance transferred, or access permanently
denied. It simply recognizes that the United States
can permit neither the uncontested vulnerability of
its own space assets nor the multiplied effectiveness
of an enemy that uses commercial space services or
employs its own satellites on orbit.
It is nontrivial in this regard that all of the
bureaucratic arguments over atmospheric, maritime,
and terrestrial control are long settled. For the Navy
this occurred in the 19th century. Thousands of
American merchant ships had been attacked before
the Navy’s West India Squadron was equipped to
crush piracy in the Caribbean Sea and the Gulf of
Mexico. It took George Washington two full terms
to get Congress to fund six-ships to protect U.S.
commerce from the Algerine Corsairs. For the Air
Force it was twelve decades later when the
extension of military capability to the air required a
public lobbying campaign for which General Billy
Mitchell was court-martialed. Because the
bureaucratic bloodletting over means of control in
these realms is over, strategists need only establish
the functional identity of space control with air, sea,
and land control.
Because political consensus on controversial topics
is measured in bipartisan terms, it is useful to note
that in 1996 the Clinton White House assigned DOD
responsibility for “deterring, warning, and if
necessary, defending against enemy attack; assuring
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that hostile forces cannot prevent our own use of
space; [and] countering, if necessary, space systems
and services used for hostile purposes.44 A few
years later Clinton’s Secretary of Defense
implemented this guidance in a Space Policy
Directive that should resolve once and for all that
space is a medium in which the United States must
prepare itself for the conduct of military activity.
It is DOD policy that space capabilities shall
be operated and employed to: assure access to
and use of space; deter and, if necessary,
defend against hostile actions; ensure that
hostile forces cannot prevent United States
use of space; ensure the United States’ ability
to conduct military and intelligence space and
space-related
activities;
enhance
the
operational effectiveness of U.S., allied, and
friendly forces; and counter, when directed,
space systems and services used for hostile
purposes.45
This language clearly stopped short of Ronald
Reagan’s 1988 policy directing DOD to “develop
and deploy a robust and comprehensive ASAT
capability with initial operational capability at the
earliest possible date.”46 But for Presidents Clinton
and Reagan to agree even in principle shows how
far we have come toward a national consensus on
space control.
Because it imposed far more restrictions than its
original proponents ever imagined, the U.S. decision
of December 2001 to withdraw from the ABM
Treaty under its Article XV provisions removed an
enormous obstacle to a responsible space strategy.
Besides its legal, political, and self-imposed
restrictions on space control, the treaty’s outright
prohibition of defense against attacking missiles
added psychological and intellectual obstacles. As
44
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the debate over missile defense intensified in the
1980s and 1990s it became increasingly partisan
with anything remotely related to military use of
space caught in the crossfire. As illustrated by the
State Department’s handling of the broad
interpretation, for example, the United States
imposed strategically significant restrictions on itself
based on how the Soviet Union might react to policy
choices that were unquestionably legal in treaty
terms. In that case Secretary George Shultz objected
publicly to a policy option on grounds that it had not
previously been the traditional one. Similarly,
Congress prohibited ASAT testing, and President
Clinton vetoed an experimental rendezvous with a
meteor because both involved target engagement
scenarios that emulated interception of attacking
Soviet missiles.
It was one thing for the United
States to comply with the
spirit of the treaty while the
Soviets
were
routinely
exceeding its letter. But the
seemingly infinite elasticity of
what was included in its spirit
went beyond good faith by
consigning ourselves to a
wholly different regime. By its remarkably
uncontroversial withdrawal notification of 2001 the
United States unburdened itself of all such
impediments to the strategic control of outer space.

the sea
offers a
particularly
apt analogy
to the outer
space
argument

The Way Forward on Space Control
With the bureaucratic and policy foundation in place
for a U.S. space control regime, sea control provides
an actual blueprint for the remainder of space
control’s political-military edifice. The sea – over
which United States control is a joint product of
diplomacy and naval operational supremacy – offers
a particularly apt analogy to the outer space
argument. Oceans, like space, are seen as the
common province of nations – a realm in which safe
passage and access to resources are fundamental
international rights. Just as a ballistic missile might
traverse outer space in a crisis, vehicles bearing
weapons of mass destruction are routinely on patrol
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throughout the high seas. But the stationing of such
weapons is banned from the ocean’s floor just as it is
from Earth orbit. No nation can claim jurisdiction
over either realm but lawless behavior is condemned
in both.
Abhorrent activities like slave trading, drug
smuggling, and piracy on the high seas are
international crimes, and JCS rules of engagement
reflect a U.S. commitment to their enforcement.
The Navy’s readiness to carry out protection and
denial responsibilities is both cause and effect of
these laws’ integrity. This capability has hardly
brought an end to crime on the high seas, but it has
tamed it enough for commerce, resource access, and
marine environmental security to be counted among
the basic entitlements of nations. United States
leadership has spawned a clear set of collectively
accepted international norms for sailors and vessels
operating in international and territorial waters. The
U.S. Navy has worked in tandem with the State
Department to see that sensible operational
principles are facilitated rather than impeded as
these codes are crafted and refined. The resultant
regime defines conditions under which force may
and may not be employed under the flags of lawabiding nations. Seafarers who comply with these
standards are entitled not just to legal protection, but
also to physical protection from vessels positioned
to offer assistance in a crisis.
This is how diplomacy and military preparedness
can work together rather than against each other to
advance vital national interests. New and updated
JCS rules of engagement never leave the drafting
stage until their compatibility with the standing body
of international law can be demonstrated. Working
together in support of U.S. sea control, these policies
of diplomacy and military preparedness secure vital
national interests while advancing rather than
inhibiting the rights of weaker seafaring nations.
Arms control’s international rules and procedures
thereby protect, focus, and magnify the effectiveness
of a U.S. military mission, while military
preparedness strengthens the effectiveness of law.
In combination, they advance a vital national
security objective with unparalleled competence.

It would not be necessary to extend this analogy to
the requirement for space control if space were the
exclusive domain of law-abiding states. But
consider the implications of a hermetic,
impoverished, diplomatically isolated North Korea
developing a three-stage launch vehicle. The United
States would surely have shared launch services as
readily as it assisted North Korea’s commercial
nuclear power program – not out of altruism or to
inhibit anyone’s access to space, but out of selfinterest to inhibit its hostile exploitation. North
Korea’s leaders would have known this but chose
instead to invest in autonomous means. In strategic
terms this was altogether logical and predictable.
What potential adversary could possibly ignore the
enormity of U.S. reliance on outer space assets that
are as vulnerable and at least as vital as her 18th
century merchant ships?
Calls by the U.S. National Command Authority for
military readiness “to counter, when directed, space
systems and services used for hostile purposes”
serve notice that no potential adversary can lightly
ignore. They call for investment in the means to
protect U.S. space assets while holding those of
other states at risk, and for legal strategies that go
beyond weapons reductions and constraints. In
short, they establish criteria against which both
policies should be measured, toward which both
should orient their creative energies, and in the
service of which the whole must exceed the sum of
its parts.
As with sea control, much of the legal infrastructure
that would underpin space control is already in
place. The 1967 Outer Space Treaty47 assigns the
same legal status to “outer space, including the
moon and other celestial bodies,” that maritime law
assigns to the high seas. This means that the Moon,
like the oceans, is immune from ownership or
sovereignty claims, and that any nation can go
47

Article I of the Outer Space Treaty: “The exploration
and use of outer space, including the moon and other
celestial bodies, shall be carried out for the benefit and in
the interests of all countries, irrespective of their degree of
economic or scientific development, and shall be the
province of all mankind.”
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there. How would that prevent, say, a technoterrorist organization from positioning itself on the
lunar surface? In legal terms, the answer is that the
Outer Space Treaty requires “non-governmental
entities in outer space” to be authorized and
supervised “by the appropriate State Party to the
Treaty.”
This provision has deep roots in maritime legal
tradition. Standing sea law affords “free transit” on
the high seas only to vessels flying the flag of a
recognized authority. The flag tells port authorities,
warships, and other vessels which state’s laws will
prosecute illegal behavior. It accepts the common
province principle, but rejects the proposition that
anarchy must therefore reign supreme. It reflects a
shared preference that states or other legitimate
entities enforce their own laws on their own
citizens. Although the law is international, violators
are subject to the penalties and protections inherent
in the legal codes of the authority behind their flag.
By exclusion, violators acting independently
relinquish entitlement to such protection. An
American taken into custody from an unflagged
vessel within another state’s territorial waters, for
example, may or may not be afforded the
presumption of innocence by the offended state’s
courts.
Unflagged vessels can be hailed, boarded, or seized
by those equipped and authorized to do so. Vessels
bearing the flags of more than one authority are not
entitled to the protection of the state behind any of
their flags. Falsely flagged vessels can be boarded
with impunity from a warship of the “true” flag
nation. Maritime law thereby achieves one of U.S.
diplomacy’s fundamental objectives – protection of
the innocent – by facilitating one of the Navy’s
fundamental objectives – exposure of the noninnocent. By proscribing illegitimate military
action, the law licenses legitimate military action.
Arms control, in other words, points the way to rules
of engagement. Navies cannot act with impunity on
the high seas, but neither can criminals.
Legitimately flagged ships engaged in illegal
behavior are treated as diplomatic rather than
military problems. Falsely or unflagged vessels are

treated as
problems.

military

rather

than

diplomatic

This, of course, is the point at which sea law takes a
course that space law is not presently equipped to
follow. Violators of space law could be subjected to
a variety of enforcement, protection, and penalty
systems, including the seizure, imprisonment,
impoundment, or punishment of their earthbound
elements, and comparable penalties upon returning
to Earth. If that system of sanctions is adequate,
there is no need for military force in space to
challenge nefarious actions in progress. But the
same could be said of maritime law enforcement, by
which logic there would be no need for coast guards
and navies. The latter point – as experts on drug
smuggling, kidnapping, weapons proliferation,
money laundering, immigration, piracy, and slave
trading are quick to point out – is absurd. Indeed,
the answer to these rhetorical questions is not only
obvious from a U.S. standpoint, but widely agreed
throughout the international community. Just as the
United States welcomed the Royal Navy’s
advancement of nineteenth century British security
interests in the Atlantic, law-abiding nations today
seldom object to a U.S. naval presence in their
regional waters.
What if an unflagged vessel anchored a few hundred
kilometers from a U.S. coastline were readying itself
to fire crude short-range ballistic or cruise missiles?
Apart from a sovereign nation’s entitlement to
protect itself do we feel safer knowing that the
perpetrator could be punished upon return to port?
Or are we heartened to know that that the Navy and
Coast Guard are trained to hail such a vessel and
confirm its intentions before it acts? One difficulty
with this analogy, of course, is that international
standards on the high seas were codified after navies
became commonplace national instruments.
Modern navies, in turn, arose after maritime crimes
and national security threats became intolerable. In
comparison, there have been few direct assaults on
national space assets, and the power to prevent or
negate such assaults is held by a mere handful of
states. And yet, the emergence of international
space law is well underway.
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Table 1 lists four such instruments to which the
United States is party, illustrating the paucity of U.S.
enforcement options in comparison with the
maritime equivalent of each. In each case the
United States has both the means and the explicit
authority to enforce international law as it relates to
the sea, but neither the means nor the explicit
authority to enforce the same provision in space. In
the case of each law of outer space, such capability
would contribute to U.S. space control in the same
measure to which analogous capability contributes
to U.S. sea control. And in each case the integrity of
the relevant law would be enhanced as a result of
sanctions implied or exercised by the fact of United
States enforcement power.
Table 1 illustrates a less obvious point as well.
Laws of the sea, established after national naval
power became commonplace, were put in place – in
part – to limit the exercise of arbitrary authority by
powerful navies. As such, they served an arms
control function – leveling a playing field under no
one’s jurisdiction. The fact that laws of outer space
are being put in place in advance of routine military
force deployments suggests their enactment
regardless of whether they are accompanied by inplace enforcement authority. It is not a question of
whether or not such laws will emerge, but who will
write them, who will enforce them, and in whose
interest. And at the risk of stating the obvious, it is
also a question of what nonexistent means of space
control will be foreclosed in the meantime. It is
always easier to foreclose future weapons than to
eliminate those in being. And, indeed, Table 1
hardly exhausts the list of emerging space legal
principles to which the United States is already
party. Additional examples include:
•

The Declaration of Legal Principles
Governing the Activities of States in the
Exploration and Uses of Outer Space
Sets forth the basic components of
international space law.48

48

Precursor to the Outer Space Treaty adopted by the
UNGA in 1963.

•

•

•

•

Principles Governing the Use by States of
Artificial Earth Satellites for International
Direct Television Broadcasting
Taking into consideration that such use has
international political, economic, social, and
cultural implications, provides that a state
which intends to establish such a broadcasting
service notify receiving states and should
establish such a service only on the basis of
agreements with those states.49
The Principle Relating to Remote Sensing
of the Earth from Space
States that such activities are to be conducted
for the benefit of all countries, with respect
for the sovereignty of all states and people
over their own natural resources and for the
rights and interests of other states.50
The Principles Relevant to the Use of
Nuclear Power Sources in Outer Space
Recognizes that nuclear power sources are
essential for some missions, but should be
designed so as to minimize public exposure to
radiation in the case of accident.51
The
Declaration
on
International
Cooperation in the Exploration and Use of
Outer Space for the Benefit and in the
Interest of All States, Taking into
Particular Account the Needs of
Developing Countries
Purpose as stated.52

Each instrument of outer space law listed above and
in Table 1 was initiated in the United Nations
Committee on the Peaceful Use of Outer Space
(UNCOPUOS). That body was created in the 1950s
at United States urging to highlight the peaceful
nature of its space program. In recent years,
however, UNCOPUOS deliberations have adopted a
discernible logic, grammar, and vocabulary
pattern.53 Prominent among its recurring themes is
49

Adopted in 1982 as UNGA Resolution 37/92.
Adopted in 1986 as UNGA Resolution 41/65.
51
Adopted in 1992 as UNGA Resolution 47/68.
52
Adopted in 1996 as UNGA Resolution 51/122.
53
Examples that follow are drawn from statements by
national representatives to the UNCPUOS UNISPACE III
Conference, Vienna, Austria, 20 July 1999.
50
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the belief that “peaceful use” of outer space begins
with its “demilitarization” – a term of art that brooks
no distinction between reconnaissance, meteorology,
communications, warning, navigation, ASAT, or
battlefield command and control missions. Military
use of space, by this logic, is simply anathema to
good order. Since properly structured regulatory
regimes would presumably be self-enforcing, new
weapon concepts quickly acquire rogue status.
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TABLE 1 – A Comparison of U.S. Enforcement Protocols for International Sea vs. Space Law
International
Sea
Law U.S. Law Enforcement Mechanisms
UN Space Law
Parties54
Equivalent55
At Sea56
Promotes a legal order to The “objective territorial principle”
facilitate global communication recognizes the right of a nation to apply
and promote peaceful use of its laws to acts committed beyond its
Outer Space 122 States including
1967
the seas based on the needs of territory which have their effect in that
57
Treaty
United States
all mankind – particularly those nation’s territory. Extra-territorial drug
of
developing
countries, laws and “hovering vehicles” are legally
whether coastal or land-locked. reached under this principle.
Doctrines of collective and individual
Vessels must assist distressed
self-defense and protection of nationals
Rescue
110 States including persons, provide warnings, safe
authorize U.S. forces to protect U.S. flag
1968
58
harbor, innocent passage, and
Agreement
United States
vessels, property, and persons from
respect to sovereign property
violent/unlawful acts.
States must investigate injuries,
loss of life, or damage to
Except as noted (re liability of
another state’s property on the
warships), “nothing in this [LOS]
Liability
105 States including high seas caused by a ship
1972
Convention affects the immunities of
59
Convention
United States
flying its flag.
Ships
warships…
operated
for
nonunjustifiably stopped outside
commercial purposes.”
territorial limits must be
compensated.
States will fix the conditions
for
the
grant
of
its
If a ship on the high seas is reasonably
nationality…for the registration
suspected of involvement in slave trade,
of ships in its territory, and for
unauthorized broadcasting, piracy, or
the right to fly its flag. Ships
false flagging, a warship that encounters
have the nationality of the state
Registration
43 States including
it may board and verify its flag rights.
1975
whose flag they are entitled to
Convention60
United States
A warning shot is a signal – usually to
fly. There must exist a genuine
warn an offending vessel to stop or
link between the state and the
maneuver in a particular manner or risk
ship. Every state shall issue to
the employment of disabling fire or
ships to which it has granted
more severe measures.
the right to any its flag
documents to that effect

Space

?

?

?

?

54

United Nations Treaties; Status of International Agreements Relating to Activities in Outer Space; States that have signed or ratified
as of February 1999.
55
1958 Geneva Convention on the High Seas; 1974 London Convention on Safety of Life at Sea; 1982 Law of the Seas; Customary
International Law.
56
The U.S. Naval Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations; NWP1-14M; FMFM 1-10; COMDTPUB P5800.
57
Outer Space Treaty.
58
Agreement of the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space. Provides
for aiding crews of spacecraft in accident or emergency landing; establishes a procedure for returning to a launching authority space
objects found beyond its territorial limits.
59
Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects. Establishes launching state’s liability for damage
caused by its space objects on the Earth’s surface, to aircraft in flight, and to space objects of other states or persons.
60
Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space. Launching state must maintain registry of space objects and
furnish specified data to UN.
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Some proponents of this agenda, including the
current UN Secretary General, believe the growth of
space commerce warrants to a new UN mission of
“preventive diplomacy,” which would extend the
UN’s role in peacemaking and peacekeeping to
arms race prevention and missile warning. A
French proposal would equip new UN agencies with
satellites, ground stations, and data processing
facilities for Earth observation, launch notifications,
transparency of military operations, and arms
control monitoring. A Chinese Resolution would
create a standard format for the acquisition,
processing, and handling of remote sensing data in
support of developing countries, demilitarize outer
space, and equip the UN to manage atmospheric
reentry of nuclear power sources. 61 Iran would ban
the transmission through space of TV signals that
broadcast values contrary to the religious and ethical
values of other sovereign states.
Some of these proposals build on the social benefits
of third world access to existing assets in space for
economic and social development. Others appeal to
the commercial benefits of protocols that regularize
access to space. Whether on humanitarian, social, or
risk management grounds, however, each also
promotes restrictions that would intentionally or
unintentionally inhibit U.S. space control.
Americans tend to regard “the law” as an
evenhanded, dispassionately enforced instrument of
justice. Although that is hardly its status in places
like North Korea and Iran, egalitarian UN principles
entitle each member state to an objective hearing on
the merits of its case. None of these countries shares
the United States sense of urgency for freedom “to
conduct military and intelligence space and spacerelated activities …and [to] counter, when directed,
space systems and services used for hostile
purposes.”

61

UNGA Resolution 51/122, “International Cooperation and
Use of Outer Space for the Benefit and in the Interest of All
States.”

Although it is the hidden agenda behind many of
these proposals, some are more blatant than others in
opposing U.S. space control. Russia, for example,
has employed standard UNCOPUOS language to
float a ban on creation of “space vehicles capable of
destroying missile attack warning space systems.”62
By focusing on warning assets that everyone
considers sacrosanct, this provision would assign
rogue status to a hypothetical class of ASAT
weapons designed to place them at risk. Since arms
control’s verification and confidence building rules
cannot tolerate fine distinctions between a weapon’s
peaceful or hostile purpose, and since “creation”
could only be defined by “observable” testing and
development practices, a ban on early warning
ASATs would effectively ban all ASATs.
Ironically, this would include the very anti-ASAT
weapons required for the Russian proposal’s
enforcement, but that would only matter if early
warning satellites were the real object of its
concern. Instead, having assigned rogue status to a
repugnant class of ASAT weapons, Russia has
positioned itself to champion physical limits on
space control.
In fact, attacks on legitimate sovereign space assets,
let alone on early warning satellites, are already acts
of war. Some such attacks, especially against early
warning satellites, would themselves warn of
impending terrestrial aggression. To add that these
attacks also violate a UNGA Resolution would be
redundant at best. In the final analysis, of course,
neither existing space laws nor the one proposed by
Russia would enshroud satellites of any kind in a
blanket of security. Nor, for that matter, would U.S.
space control ever permanently eliminate all anxiety
on the matter. Neither the United States nor the
international community, after all, can finally
control all behavior even under well-established
political-military regimes governing the high seas.
62

Interview comments by Colonel General Vladimir
Yakolev, Supreme Commander of Russia’s Strategic
Missile Forces, January 1999, FBIS, Interfax.
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But if unsanctioned norms were its only regulator,
the law of the sea would be the law of the jungle – a
continuous struggle among conflicting interests
regulated only by the balance of power.
It may or may not be true that such anarchy exists in
outer space today, but how are violators of
international space norms deterred, defeated, or
punished? If peaceful space use cannot be secured,
how can its military abuse be controlled? What
distinguishes offensive activities from defensive
activities? How does a right to attack no one differ
from a right to attack everyone? How are violators
denied the benefits of their actions before it is too
late?
Nor can it be denied that there are nations who
would feign outrage over United States exercise of
its space control responsibilities. But since power is
made manifest primarily by its use, the same is true
of any unexercised sovereign entitlement. What if
the United States had never yet deployed carrier
battle groups to show force in a tense region? Some
governments will be threatened, jealous, or
righteously indignant, but most would expect the
world’s most economically, militarily, and
technologically advanced power to structure and
enforce rules of the road according to its interests.
Those whose ideals comport with ours, no matter
how “shocked” they claim to be in public, will
welcome it as a commonplace exercise of
leadership. There are states throughout the world
that would prefer it not be so, but the fact is that the
United States operates the world’s only global blue
water navy, and that it serves all law-abiding nations
by enforcing collectively held standards. To reject
such a space regime while welcoming analogous
laws of the sea would be an inconsistency few of
them could long sustain.
If the United States concurs with sentiments
expressed in UNCOPUOS circles, a passive
approach to its proceedings will advance U.S.
interests.63 If not, questions arise that are worthy
63

It is worth noting in this regard, that the U.S.
representative to the 1999 CPUOS convention took the
course of least resistance by stressing aspects of past and
current U.S. space policy that are fully compatible with the

of thought while capabilities and procedures for
space control are being deliberated. What space
asset identifiers might be equivalent to the
flagging of vessels at sea? How might legitimate
“identify yourself” inquiries be authenticated?
How would distinctions between military and
civilian spacecraft be affirmed? What recognized
standards would signal intrusions that violate
established rules? What venue might structure a
strategically sound international space regime?
Contrary to American ideals, legislation is not
necessarily a neutral expression of universally held
values and more often reflects trade-offs among
conflicting interests. Societal ordering schemes are
only purchased by the expenditure of some
individual liberties – and vice versa. Thus, two
fundamental truths are clear regarding the law of
outer space. The first is that such laws will be made;
the second is that they will serve someone’s
interests. It is not clear what further limitations on
its freedom of action in space the United States
should accept in order to promote an expanded legal
regime that might better serve its national interests.
What is more clear and immediate is that the
international community, heavily influenced by antiAmerican interests, is presently deliberating norms
that cannot be enforced and would undermine
central U.S. interests if they were. If space
strategists choose not to engage that challenge – by
staying “above it” or denying its existence – the
rules will be made by others. And unless we equip
ourselves with routinely demonstrated means of
enforcement, those rules will be enforced by others.
Given United States’ reliance on the military and
commercial products of space, the countless ways
by which these can be negated, and the ease with
which they can be employed for hostile purposes,
space control is as challenging as it is essential.
Military organizations are familiar with such
challenges, but the solution to this one will require

organization’s agenda. See Statement by Ambassador John B.
Ritch, “Global Cooperation In The Exploration Of Space:
Fusing The UN Idea And Mankind’s Greatest Adventure,”
UNISPACE III Conference, Vienna, Austria, 20 July 1999.
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more than shoulders to the wheel and noses to the
grindstone. It is a no-nonsense national security
dilemma, whose commercial, economic, and
diplomatic dimensions are at least as relevant as its
military content. However clear it may be that
military and diplomatic instruments of national
power must be focused toward a common strategic
end, U.S. policy has treated them in either-or terms
for fifty years. The naval analogy offers the best,
perhaps only, exception to this pattern. Now,
because arms control will either enable or disable
space control, space control strategists must learn to
see beyond this tradition and take steps to create
enforceable twenty-first century space law.
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This first installment of the Journal’s U.S. space
policy update will recap significant developments
since the beginning of the George W. Bush
administration. The formal mechanism chosen by
the administration to deal with policy issues is the
Policy Coordinating Committee (PCC) system,
composed of high-level officials from throughout
the executive branch.
This system was
established by National Security Presidential
Directive (NSPD)-1, dated 13 February 2001,
which set up 6 regional and 11 topic area PCCs,
none of which addressed space issues.
NSPD-1 gave the National Security Advisor
authority to set up additional PCCs as
appropriate. A Space PCC (along with three
others) was added in April 2001. The enabling
documentation and lines of authority make it
clear that the PCCs were set up to address
national security issues, only incidentally
touching on other areas like civil and commercial
space. Although it is represented in the Space
PCC, NASA is not one of its most powerful
players.
The PCC system bears a striking resemblance to
the Senior Interagency Groups (SIGs) of the
Reagan administration, which were not
considered an effective mechanism for managing
civil space issues. SIG (Space) was disliked by
Congress for its lack of transparency, apparent
disinterest in outside input, and perceived goal of
centralizing the nation’s space policy-making in
the White House. It operated in an environment

that promoted interagency turf battles dominated
by the top officials of the national security
community. The current Space PCC is viewed by
some in a similar light.
What follows is a timeline of key space policy
events that have occurred since the beginning of
the Bush administration.
February 2001: In an act reminiscent of the early
months of the Clinton administration, the White
House directed NASA to make drastic changes in
the International Space Station (ISS) program to
curb cost overruns. The ISS would lose a
habitation module, a crew return vehicle, and the
ability to accommodate long-term crews of more
than three people. Such changes directly affect
agreements signed in 1998 with international
partners.
March 2001: NASA announced cancellation of
the X-33 and X-34 experimental launcher
programs. (The Air Force’s decision in August
2001 not to participate in X-33 ended hopes of
reviving the project.)
Both programs were
experiencing technical and cost problems before
the arrival of the Bush administration, so their
termination was not completely unexpected. But
the decision meant abandoning two high-profile
efforts involving a combined NASA investment
of over $1.1 billion.
May 2001: NASA awarded its first round of
technology development and study contracts
under the Space Launch Initiative (SLI),
amounting to $767 million. Like the terminated
X-vehicle programs, SLI also predated the Bush
administration. Moving ahead with these contract
awards indicated that the administration was
placing its confidence in SLI to provide NASA’s
next generation of space access. Later, in
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November 2002, NASA refocused SLI on
development of an Orbital Space Plane.

April 2003: The space policy review produced its
first results with NSPD-27, “U.S. Commercial
Remote Sensing Policy,” which superseded the
November 2001: The White House announced
Clinton administration’s Presidential Decision
the nomination of Sean O’Keefe as NASA
Directive-23. While continuing the existing
Administrator. The Bush administration’s long
policy of encouraging U.S. industry while
delay in appointing a new administrator, and its
protecting national security, NSPD-27 also
choice of a deputy director of the Office of
directed U.S. government agencies to “rely to the
Management and Budget (OMB) with no
maximum practical extent on U.S commercial
previous space experience, sparked speculation
remote sensing space capabilities for filling
over what this meant for the space agency.
imagery and geospatial needs for military,
Analysts saw this belated attention as an
intelligence, foreign policy, homeland security,
indication of NASA’s low priority in the
and civil users.”
The National Geospatialpresident’s agenda. The choice of Sean O’Keefe
Intelligence Agency (NGA) was already
prompted some observers to see his mandate as
beginning to implement this policy, having
little more than damage control,
awarded the first of its ClearView contracts
primarily for the troubled ISS
to DigitalGlobe and Space Imaging in
NSPD-27
program.
January 2003.
directed U.S.
February 2002: The president’s
budget request for fiscal year 2003
included funding for a major new
NASA initiative in nuclear power
and propulsion.

government
agencies to rely
on U.S.
commercial
remote sensing

April 2002: NASA ordered the
termination of work on the X-38 emergency
return vehicle prototype. Space station partners,
particularly the Europeans, expressed their
displeasure at the apparent breach of agreement
and the lack of prior consultation.
June 2002: NSPD-15, “National Space Policy
Review,” initiated a series of interagency reviews
that lead to the formulation of new policies as
noted below.
February 2003: The loss of space shuttle
Columbia and its crew forced the nearly
completed draft of a new space transportation
policy back to the drawing board. The report of
the Columbia Accident Investigation Board,
released in August 2003, included tough criticism
of NASA’s organizational culture, assigning it
part of the blame for the accident.

September 2003: DigitalGlobe won the
first award in NGA’s NextView program,
which put the imagery agency in the
business of providing direct support to the
next generation of U.S. commercial remote
sensing satellites.

January 2004: In a high-profile speech at NASA
Headquarters, President Bush set a new course
for the space agency by reviving a 50-year-old
vision that set the nation’s sights on the Moon,
Mars, and beyond – after returning the shuttle to
flight status and completing the space station.
NSPD-31, “U.S. Space Exploration Policy,”
called for retirement of the shuttle (which was
later set for 2010) and development of new space
transportation capabilities that would support
human missions to the Moon starting between
2015 and 2020. Meanwhile, U.S. research on the
space station would be refocused to support space
exploration goals. Also, in the same week as the
space
exploration announcement,
NASA
Administrator Sean O’Keefe revealed plans to
discontinue servicing of the Hubble Space
Telescope other than preparing it for a safe deorbit – a decision that generated a firestorm of
criticism.
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December 2004: Two more space policies were
released within days of each other. NSPD-39,
“U.S. Space-Based Positioning, Navigation, and
Timing Policy,” reinforced existing policy on
sustaining operation of the Global Positioning
System (GPS) and improving capabilities for
denial of service to hostile users. The policy
recognized GPS as critical infrastructure for
homeland security purposes. NSPD-40, “U.S.
Space Transportation Policy,” continued the
pursuit of assured access to space, technology
development, and a healthy U.S. commercial
launch industry, and also called for demonstration
of “operationally responsive” access to space.
Decisions on the future of the Evolved
Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) program
were deferred until 2010.

community due to its limited overall growth and
its substantial cutbacks previously proposed
funding for space science, Earth science, and
aeronautics over the next few years.

April 2005: Mike Griffin took over as NASA
Administrator, a move that elicited strong
approval from around the community, including
the Congress.
He pledged to revisit Sean
O’Keefe’s unpopular decision to terminate
servicing of the Hubble Space Telescope. A
month later, he sent Congress a revised spending
plan that, among other things, cut funding for his
predecessor’s nuclear power and propulsion
program.
July 2005: The Bush administration requested
that the Congress grant relief from the Iran NonProliferation Act of 2000 to permit NASA to
purchase the services of Russian Soyuz and
Progress vehicles to sustain the space station
while the shuttle is grounded. In response,
Congress amended the Act (through Public Law
109-112) in November 2005.

Russian Federation Space
Policy: Back to the Future?

September 2005: Just five months after taking
office, NASA Administrator Griffin unveiled the
transportation architecture that would be used for
the return to the Moon. As expected since midsummer, the architecture was substantially
derived from space shuttle components.
February 2006: The President’s proposed FY07
budget for NASA disappointed many in the

The Bush administration worked on a new
National Space Policy from the beginning of
2004 through mid-2006. As this issue was going
to press (October 2006) that policy was released
and it replaced the 1996 National Space Policy of
the Clinton administration (PDD-49). For the
next issue of Space and Defense, this section will
focus on analyzing the new policy.

Russian Space Policy Update
William P. Barry, D. Phil.

With the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1992,
the Russian Federation found itself the inheritor
of much of the Soviet space program. However,
this “new”country also had a new leadership that
had little interest in a space effort that was viewed
as tainted by its close association with the
leadership of the Communist Party and its
management through the Soviet defense industry
bureaucracy.
In addition, the extraordinary
budgets and priorities assigned to resources
designated for space efforts were a luxury that
Russia could now little afford. In the face of
these enormous challenges, the Russian Space
Agency was created and Mr. Yuri Koptev was
appointed to lead it. Such an organization
devoted to civil space was a new concept,
although many of the Russian Space Agency’s
officials, like Mr. Koptev, had previously served
in the coyly named Ministry of General
Machinebuilding – the ballistic missile and space
ministry of the Soviet government. For the
remainder of the 1990s Russian space policy was
largely ignored at the highest political levels and
left to survive on meager (and frequently
undelivered) fiscal rations, while Mr. Koptev
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courted foreign assistance and struggled to build a
space agency in the Western mold.
Considering the circumstances Mr. Koptev was
remarkably successful. In the late 1990s, Russia
retained its reputation as a “space power” (as
tarnished as that reputation may have been)
largely through the central role it came to play in
the International Space Station (ISS).
The
Russian government had also created (in
September 1999) an organization parallel in title
to NASA by handing Mr. Koptev control over the
Russian aviation industry and creating the
Russian
Aviation
and
Space
Agency
(Rosaviakosmos). (The
President Putin
aviation industry in the
referred to the
Soviet
Union
had
always been managed
space program
as a separate Ministry.
as an engine to
One of the interesting
drive growth in
contrasts of the Cold
high technology
War is the fact that the
Soviet space program
effectively grew out of the artillery industry,
while in the U.S. the space program had its
primary roots in the aviation industry). However,
the commitments to the ISS were consuming
Rosaviakosmos. As the substantial hardware
reserves from the Soviet era were depleted, and as
contractual payments from NASA were slashed
after the passage of the Iran Nonproliferation Act
of 2000, Russia’s ISS commitments grew to
consume 48 percent of the Rosaviakosmos budget
in 2001. The simple fact that the Russian space
program survived the break up of the Soviet
Union and eight years of the Yeltsin
Administration is a testament to the robustness of
Russian space hardware, the dedication of its
workers (often in the face of little or no pay), the
adroitness of its leadership in adapting to new
circumstances, and some good fortune in finding
international partners. Yet, as the new century
dawned Mr. Koptev’s amazing balancing act was
becoming increasingly difficult to sustain.

Political change came just in time for the Russian
space program. After Vladimir Putin became
President of the Russian Federation in 2000, his
government began to face the financial gap
between its space aspirations and the budget
bottom line. In 2000 Russia allocated a paltry
$166 million for the Federal Space Budget
(aviation was still funded under a separate budget
line, and this figure is not believed to include
military space spending or other special space
programs that are funded separately (e.g., the
GLONASS satellite navigation system). Yet, in
2002, the Russian Federal Space budget began a
dramatic increase; rising by over fifty percent
from the 2001 figure. Much of the increase was
applied to non-ISS spending (which doubled from
$95 million in 2001 to $190 million in 2002).
This budget growth trend has continued over the
last five years, with dramatic growth in the
overall budget, but larger part of the increases
being allocated to non-ISS programs. In fact, in
the last three years the Federal Space Budget has
more than tripled (2003 budget: $263 million;
2006 budget: $793 million). Economic stability
and the influx of tremendous oil wealth have
allowed such increases in spending, but in
comparison to aspirations Russian funding levels
remain very low. Russia’s spending on space
amounts to less than five percent of the NASA
budget and Russia now ranks fifth in international
spending levels on space (behind the United
States, the European Space Agency, Japan, and
China – just recently having moved ahead of
India).
While the financial turn-around began in 2002,
structural and personnel changes took another
two years. As part of President Putin’s sweeping
reorganization of the Russian government in the
run-up to the spring of 2004 Presidential election,
Rosaviakosmos was broken into its more
traditional constituent parts. Responsibility for
space was vested in the Federal Space Agency
(Roskosmos) and aviation responsibilities were
assigned to a separate organization. Mr. Koptev,
the only leader the space agency had known, was
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replaced by the then-Commander of Russian
Military Space Forces, Colonel-General Anatolii
Perminov. Retiring from military service, Mr.
Perminov made his presence felt immediately
throughout the Russian space program with a
series of visits to Roskosmos facilities and
contractors. At Roskosmos headquarters, he
overhauled the leadership team, bringing in a
number of people with whom he had worked in
the military. Two years on, the continuing pace
of change and increased energy is still evident at
Roskosmos.
The changes at Roskosmos reflected a significant
shift in Russian leadership attitudes toward space.
President Putin had begun to take a positive
public position on space in the year prior the
shakeup at Roskosmos by referring to the space
program as an engine that could drive growth in
the high-technology sector.
Yet, his more
assertive attitude toward space became much
more apparent after the appointment of Mr.
Perminov in March 2004. In a first for a Russian
President, Mr. Putin visited Roskosmos
Headquarters to make a speech and present
awards marking Cosmonautics Day, 12 April
2004. During his speech President Putin noted
that:
Thanks to space research we joined the
community of developed countries and
established a firm foothold there. It was this
sphere of activity precisely that allowed our
country to achieve leading positions in a
range of hi-tech fields. Moreover, since the
very beginning of the space age we were
aware of our special historic mission….[space
should] become an arena for peaceful
cooperation, based on trust, sober calculation
and a clear-cut understanding of all national
interests.
President Putin’s support of the Russian space
program is not simply a return to Soviet attitudes
or a matter of nostalgia for the Soviet era. On a
purely practical level, the space program is one of

Russia’s few world-class inheritances from the
Soviet Union. The current Russian political
leadership recognizes that Sputnik and the space
program were key factors that allowed the USSR
to establish itself as a superpower. Although the
tone may be somewhat reminiscent of the Soviet
era, President Putin’s accentuation of Russian
space accomplishments over the last two years
has not been focused on proving the superiority
of his political system, as much as it has been on
signaling the continued relevance of Russian
power in the world. This is evident in the
increased, and less cynical, Russian domestic
press coverage of the space program and by the
rise in the use of space cooperation as a foreign
policy tool. For example, during the May 2003
visit of President Putin to Malaysia, it was
announced that Russia would fly a Malaysian in
space as part of a $900 million deal to sell 18
Russian Su-30 fighter jets. Since the appointment
of Mr. Perminov as head of Roskosmos in early
2004, the visibility of the Russian space program
at the diplomatic level and the pace of
Roskosmos international activity has further
accelerated.
In another telling sign of leadership interest,
space was one of fifteen long-term national
“targeted programs” created for key economic
development fields in 2005. The “Federal Space
Program 2006-2015” was approved by the
Russian Government in late 2005. It outlines the
space goals for Russia over the next ten years and
authorizes the expenditure of some $8 billion
dollars. Russian press reports indicate that the
Roskosmos budget is expected to continue its
upward climb until it reaches approximately $1
billion per year (expected in approximately
2010).
While the Federal Space Program
represents a significant increase in political and
financial recognition for Roskosmos, it falls far
below the aspirations that Mr. Perminov
suggested when the Program was first publicly
discussed in the summer of 2005. Like many
other Russian government agencies, Roskosmos
had evidently hoped for a significant slice of

56

Space and Defense, Fall 2006

Russia’s new oil wealth. Although the increases
in planned spending over the next ten years are
significant, Mr. Perminov himself has publicly
acknowledged that the approved funding levels
will be barely adequate to meet the rather limited
goals of the Federal Space Program.
(Interestingly, those goals have been publicly
touted for their attention to services to Russian
citizens, including the replacement and upgrade
of long-neglected communication satellites,
meteorological satellites, and remote sensing
satellites. The Program has very limited space
science and exploration objectives, and evidently
does not authorize a human spaceflight program
beyond participation in the ISS.) In fact, Russian
government projections indicate that achieving
the objectives of the Federal Space Program
2006-2015 will likely cost approximately $12.5
billion. Thus, success of the Program will hinge
on attracting a planned $4.5 billion in revenues
from the sale of space goods and services to
international customers over the next ten years.
A lackluster launch services market and the
growth of launch vehicle competitors will force
Roskosmos to be very creative and aggressive if
it hopes to supplement its 10-year budget by
nearly fifty percent through what Russia refers to
as “off-budget” sources.
The last two years have been a time of significant
change for Russian space policy, as the country
has become more nationalistic and more capable
of funding its own space programs. Political
expectations have increased and Russian space
efforts once again enjoy pride of place in
demonstrating national capabilities.
Yet,
although funding increases have been generous
by Russian standards, there remains a significant
gap between funding needs and allocations.
Success appears to continue to rely on obtaining
funds from outside the country, while
simultaneously acting in a way that might tend
discourage significant “outside” investment. This
suggests that Russian space policy is now an
interesting hybrid of Soviet style attitudes and
objectives and post-Soviet approaches to funding.

Whether this hybrid approach will be successful
remains to be seen.

European Space Policy Update
Richard Buenneke
Richard Buenneke is a Senior Policy Analyst
for the Aerospace Corporation

Four

decades after the first autonomous
European satellite launch, Europe found itself at a
crossroads regarding the course of its security
space programs. Facing continued struggles to
develop dedicated military satellites at the
national level, Europe considered a strategy based
on dual-use technology and past successes in
civilian launch and satellite programs. This
approach centered on a series of “great projects”
for navigation, global monitoring, and space
situational awareness.
Despite early predictions by European military
space enthusiasts, a range of political, strategic,
and economic factors slowed the progress of
these flagship programs. By the mid-2000s,
Europe’s ability to deploy capabilities that would
approach those of the United States appeared
doubtful. At the same time, advances in satellite
technology could give Europe the ability to
develop capabilities that could either create new
challenges for the Western alliance or contribute
to collective security.

National Programs
Among European nations, France continued to
devote the most attention and resources –
approximately $800 million per year – to
dedicated military programs.
Evoking the
policies of former President Charles de Gaulle,
France launched the first of a new generation of
Hélios reconnaissance satellites in December
2004. Looking to new mission areas, France’s
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General
Armaments
Directorate
also
demonstrated a “swarm” of Essaim electronic
intelligence microsatellites. As a result, France
had the bulk of non-communications system in
orbit by the middle of the decade (see table
below)
Comparison of U.S. and European Material
Capabilities in Space*
United
Europe
States
Optical imagery
3 satellites
2 satellites
(Hélios)
Radar imagery
3 satellites
0
Military
5 satellites
0
meteorology
Signals intelligence
15 satellites 2
demonstrators
(Essaim)
Early warning
7 satellites
0
Space surveillance
1
0
demonstrator
Satellite navigation
30 satellites 0
Telecommunications 31 satellites 12 satellites
(including 2
NATO)
Data relay and
14 satellites 1 civil
secondary missions
demonstrator
(Artemis)
*Situation as of 1 May 2005
Source: French Ministry of Defense, cited in French
National Assembly, Commission on National Defense and
Armed Forces, “Défense: Équipement des forces; Espace,
communications, dissuasion,” Le projet de loi des finances
pour 2006, Vol. IX, No. 2540.

At the same time, budget constraints prevented
France from developing an imaging radar system.
To increase its access to all-weather intelligence,
France and Germany agreed to a “pooled system”
that permitted joint use of the electro-optic Hélios
satellites and the German SAR-Lupe radar
satellites by 2009. France also partnered with
Italy on the Optical and Radar Federated Earth
Observation (ORFEO) program. When fully

operational later in the decade, his program will
network the French Pleiades optical and the radar
payloads of Italy’s Constellation of small
Satellites for Mediterranean basin Observation
(COSMO-SkyMed).
The dual-use character of ORFEO was repeated
in a number of other national and European
programs. At the national level, the German
space agency began work on TerraSAR-X
(scheduled for launch in late 2006) and the
British Ministry of Defense launched in 2005 a
TopSat minisatellite imaging demonstration.
Budget constraints also led several European
governments to leverage commercial technology
and financing for their Military Satellite
Communications (MilSatCom) networks. On
projects such as the United Kingdom’s (UK)
Skynet 5 or Spain’s XTAR, defense ministries
would agree to serve as anchor tenants for
privately financed satellites. While France, Italy
and Germany opted for more traditional
government-owned
approaches
for
their
Milsatcom systems, these countries also explicitly
linked their purchases to national industrial
policies.
The emphasis on industrial policy sometimes
complicated efforts to enhance interoperability
among national European systems. The closest
integration occurred in MILSATCOM, where a
team of UK, France and Italy was selected to
provide capacity for NATO. Coordination was
less evident in reconnaissance satellite programs,
where systems remained truly “national” with
only minimal integration between ground
segments.

European Policy
To fashion a grander design for military space,
leading European military planners and aerospace
executives sought to ensure space helped create
an “ever closer union” of European nations. They
argued that space technologies could play an
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important role in supporting peacekeeping,
humanitarian relief and homeland security
functions as well as “out-of-area” military
operations. Enthusiasm for this approach was
greatest among the technocracy of France, where
President Jacques Chirac hailed France’s role as
the “motive force” for ensuring that Europe did
not become a “vassal” to an American space
hegemon.
By contrast, the UK remained skeptical of any
space project that sought to bolster European
Union military capabilities at the expense of the
Atlantic alliance.
German officials also
questioned calls by industry experts to double
Europe’s military space budget, noting financial
constraints.

European leaders
argued that space
technologies could play
an important role in
peacekeeping,
humanitarian relief,
and “out-of-area”
operations

The focal point
for this policy
debate became
Galileo, a joint
program of the
European
Union (EU) and
European Space
Agency
to
develop
an
autonomous
navigation satellite system. Galileo’s civilian
positioning, navigation, and timing capabilities
were relatively non-controversial and seen by
many experts as a valuable augmentation to the
U.S. Global Positioning System.
However,
European plans for a dual-use “public regulated
service” on Galileo raised more concerns about
potential competition with GPS.
The controversy over Galileo reached its peak in
December 2001, when U.S. Deputy Defense
Secretary Paul Wolfowitz wrote to EU defense
ministers expressing concerns about potential
interference of Galileo’s security signals with
GPS military bands. Although this specific
technical issue was resolved in a US-EU
agreement signed in June 2004, the controversy

also highlighted a growing divergence of views
between the United States and EU regarding the
role of space in supporting “security” missions
and European reliance on American-run “global
utilities.”
As the decade progressed, concerns about a
potential transatlantic rivalry in space abated as
overall relations between the United States and
Continental Europe improved and the EU
Constitution was rejected in French and Dutch
referendums. By early 2006, delays and cost
overruns in the first phase of the Galileo program
– combined with continuing controversies over
China’s role as a minority partner in the program
– cooled the ardor of many European
governments for large, dual-use projects.
By 2006, general pressures on government
spending also suggested that a second space
“flagship,”
the
Global
Monitoring
for
Environment and Security program, would be
stretched out to fit tighter budgets. Although the
EU Commission still sought to expand its role in
space, these efforts were reoriented away from
comprehensive European Space Policy and
towards a more incremental “road map” that
emphasizes
interoperability
and
tighter
integration into terrestrial homeland security
missions.
The renewed interest in integrated capabilities
also may create opportunities for a more
Atlanticist approach to military space. One
promising candidate for such integration could be
Space Situational Awareness, where European
space surveillance sensors and satellite
monitoring capabilities could be integrated with
U.S. military space networks to improve allied
commanders’ understanding of friendly as well as
potentially hostile space activities. Transatlantic
ties also could be strengthened
through
cooperation between the U.S. and UK on
operationally responsive microsatellites derived
from
the
TopSat
demonstration.
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Perhaps more significantly, European nations
expressed a growing interest in measures for
protecting their space infrastructures. These
efforts – which include support for Russian and
Chinese diplomatic initiatives for multilateral
“transparency and confidence building measures”
– challenge many of the Cold War Assumptions
of U.S. policy for sharing space surveillance data.
The result may be the creation of a “two-way
street” for information sharing, thus extending the
Security guarantees of the North Atlantic Treaty
into outer space.

CHINA AND ASIA
SPACE POLICY UPDATE
JOHN D. WOLF
John D. Wolf is a Senior Intelligence Analyst
with the L3 Corporation

You can’t believe everything you hear about the
Chinese space program. I worked in Beijing in
the late 1990s, and there I encountered a man
named Mr. Li. Mr. Li spoke good English,
appeared well educated, and claimed to have been
in the Chinese Air Force. He would sometimes
talk with me about the Chinese space program,
particularly about the Chinese space launch
facility in Tibet where they were preparing for a
mission to the Moon some time before the end of
1999. The purpose of the mission, he said, was to
crack open the Moon to allow the Earth to pass
through it and enter the next century. The story
pretty much went downhill from there.
Eventually I had to break off my relationship with
Mr. Li, explaining that his version of reality and
mine were too far apart.
The real Chinese space program has recently
entered a new and exciting phase: manned
spaceflight.
The Chinese successfully put
astronauts in Earth orbit in 2003 and 2005. This
makes them only the third country in the world to

develop this level of space technology. These
launches have sparked tremendous popular
enthusiasm and pride in China for their space
accomplishments, and they look forward to
greater achievements. Unfortunately, anyone
searching for reliable information on the future of
the Chinese manned space program will likely be
frustrated by the lack of credible information.
The only published space policy document was
done in 2000, long before the first manned
mission. It contained few concrete details. Since
then, while there is plenty of speculation in the
popular press, real government information on the
manned space program has largely been limited
to brief statements, little more than sound bites,
by government or space industry officials. The
Chinese are not very free with information in
some areas, and since the space program is
viewed as connected with their military, it is a
sensitive topic. Such public statements as have
been made can be woven together into an outline
of sorts on China’s plans. The question remains,
however, how closely this outline matches
China’s actual intentions.
China could prove either a competitor or a partner
with the United States in developing manned
space capabilities. It is therefore important to
know, as best we can, what China’s policy is for
manned spaceflight. The starting point for such
knowledge should be what Chinese officials have
said their program consists of. Then, later, as
they progress in their activities, we can get a
sense of the reliability of this data by comparing
words and actions.

Initial Policy Statement: The 2000
White Paper
The closest that the Chinese have come to a
public space policy is the State Council
publication of “China’s Space Activities: a White
Paper,” in November 2000. This was a first-ever
public government outline of their space
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programs and enumerated
development targets:

the

following

The short-term development targets (for the
next decade) are:
- To build up an earth observation system
[including] meteorological satellites,
resource satellites, oceanic satellites and
disaster monitoring satellites.
- To set up an independently operated
satellite
broadcasting
and
telecommunications system [with] geostationary telecom satellites and TV live
broadcasting satellites.
- To establish an independent satellite
navigation and positioning system.
The long-term development targets (for the
next 20 years or more) [include]:
- To establish a multi-function and multiorbit space infrastructure composed of
various satellite systems and set up a
satellite ground application system.
- To establish China's own manned
spaceflight system and carry out manned
spaceflight scientific research and
technological experiments on a certain
scale.
- To upgrade the overall level and capacity
of China's launch vehicles.
- To realize manned spaceflight and
establish an initially complete R and D
testing system for manned space projects.
- To establish a coordinated and complete
national
satellite
remote-sensing
application system.
- To develop space science and explore
outer space by developing a scientific
research and technological experiment
satellite group of the next generation,
[and] carrying out pre-study for outer
space exploration centering on the
exploration of the moon.”1

•

•

In sum, the Chinese published ambitious space
goals including manned spaceflight, manned
space experimentation, and lunar exploration.
Discussions about the final goal have been
somewhat ambiguous and controversial but later
sources have clarified that the manned space
program includes manned lunar missions. The
formal adoption of these programs was made
public by Luan Enjie, Administrator of the China
National Space Agency (CNSA), in a 2001 report
indicating that space science, deep space
exploration and manned space flight were part of
China’s development targets for the Tenth FiveYear Plan (2001-2005).2
Since that time, there has been
no comprehensive government
statement of policy for China’s
space programs. The CNSA
website currently has a link
called “Space Policy,” but
clicking there will lead the
reader to a copy of the 2000 White Paper. Those
interested in China space policy today are
generally left to piece together statements by
government or space program officials, most of
which reveal little more than one or two nuggets
at a time.

the
Chinese
published
ambitious
space goals

From these statements a sort of policy can be
assembled, or at least an outline of the declared
space program can be seen. What follows is a
summary of what has been said from 2003 into
2006 by officials in the program or other
government spokesmen. Although fragmented,
the collection of such statements expands on this
initial outline and provides a basis for tracking
the development of manned spaceflight
technology. In the near term, the focus of such
statements has been on plans for the next
missions in the Shenzhou (Divine Vessel)
2

1

The Information Office of the State Council, China's
Space Activities, a White Paper, 22 November 2000,
emphasis added.

Luan Enjie, Administrator of CNSA, “Policy and
Prospects for the Development of China's Space
Technology,” Aerospace China, Winter 2001, emphasis
added.
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program that has included the two manned
missions to date.

Future Shenzhou Missions
During the months leading up to and especially
after the successful flight of Shenzhou 6 in
October 2005, Chinese space officials apparently
felt more confident in making predictions for the
future of this program. Yang Yiwei, China’s first
astronaut was quoted by People’s Daily in August
2005 as saying that Shenzhou 7 would fly in 2007
and include a space walk. He also said that
Shenzhou 8 would leave a cabin in space for later
docking activity by Shenzhou 9, but he gave no
timetable for these missions.1 The Director of the
Manned Space Engineering Office, Tang
Xianming, gave a statement in October 2005 that
said a spacewalk would in fact occur in 2007 and
that manned docking would take place in 20092012.2
By early 2006, however, the planned launch date
for the Shenzhou 7 mission had been pushed back
to 2008. The new Director of the Manned Space
Engineering Office, Wang Zhougui, announced
the change and that “the space walking astronauts
will walk in the [Chinese-made] space suit and do
some space experiments. Our initial plans are to
have 1 or 2 astronauts walk in space for about
half an hour.”3 This shift was confirmed a week
later by Huang Chunping, chief consultant for
China’s manned launch vehicle system, in a
Xinhua interview. “There is nothing wrong,” said
Huang, “We just need more time to prepare for
the mission.”4
Also by early 2006, the space-dock mission was
being connected to the Shenzhou 8 flight. Wang
Zhougui was again the source of this. He was
1

People’s Daily Online, 12 August 2005.
Xinhua, People’s Daily Online, 17 October 2005.
3
China Daily: Spacewalk Mission Set for 2008: Official,
24 February 2006, FBIS CPP20060224074023.
4
Beijing Xinhua, “China to Delay Launch of Shenzhou-7
Spacecraft to 2008,” 4 March 2006, FBIS
CPP20060304054017.
2

quoted by China Daily as saying that “Shenzhou
8, with the mission of a space dock, will be
launched around 2009 to 2011.” It was not clear
from his remarks what equipment from which
missions would be part of the space dock
operation. He said only that “space docks refer to
those between two space flights or between a
space flight and a space capsule.”5

Space Lab
Beyond the Shenzhou program itself, Chinese
officials have revealed an interest in two manned
orbiting systems. Remarks on these systems go
back at least to the enthusiastic days after the
Shenzhou 5 launch, when Zhang Qingwei,
Deputy Commander of China’s manned space
program, said China “would strive for
breakthroughs in space rendezvous and docking
technology for launching a space lab and
eventually a manned space station.”6 Details on
what China means by a space lab have been few.
In early 2006, however, a presentation to the
National People’s Congress on the space program
stated that the construction of a “sky lab” was
part of the Five-Year Plan for 2006-2010
submitted to the Congress for approval.7

Chinese Manned Space Station
As mentioned above, Zhang Qingwei referred in
2003 to the plan for a Chinese space station.
Such a craft would “enable China to carry out
large-scale
scientific
experiments
and
applications in space,” said Zhang, as part of the
manned space program originally laid down in
1992. He further stated that such space-based
infrastructure as the space lab and station would
5

China Daily, “Spacewalk Mission Set for 2008:
Official,” 24 February 2006, FBIS CPP20060224074023.
6
Xinhua News Agency, 16 October 2003, emphasis
added, China to Develop Space Lab, Space Station.
7
Xinhua, People’s Daily Online, 7 March 2006, China's
Space Program Seeks New Breakthroughs in Five Years.

62

Space and Defense, Fall 2006

serve as a platform for deep space probes.8 The
inclusion of a space station in the manned space
program was confirmed in late 2003 by the
deputy director of CNSA.
In 2003, the Chinese were saying that a space
station would take “about 15 years” to complete.
Wang Yongzhi, described by Xinhua as chief
designer of China's manned space program since
1992, made this statement in a speech to a group
of high school students.9 Huang Chunping of the
launch vehicle program said in February 2004
that China would have a space station by 2015.10
Again, with practically no expansion on details of
the program, Chinese space officials in late 2005
and early 2006 were still stating that a space
station was in the plan. Zhang Qingwei was
saying no more than that China would
“eventually” launch a manned space station to
carry out large-scale experiments.11
Wang
Zhougui included a Chinese space station in his
February 2006 review of the manned space
program, but he likewise gave no indication of
when they might launch such a station.12 Hu
Shixiang, described as “a former senior
commander” in China’s manned space program,
stated in March 2006 that the space station was in
the 11th Five Year Plan submitted (with the sky
lab) to the National People’s Congress.13
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Hong Kong Hsiang Kang Shang Pao, “China’s Lunar
Probe, Aerospace Development Programs,” 18 October
2003, FBIS CPP20031213000078.
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Hong Kong Wen Wei Po, “China To Set Up Space
Laboratory Before 2009 and Space Station Before 2015,”
30 March 2004, CPP20040410000026.
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Xinhua, People’s Daily Online, 13 October 2005.
12
China Daily, “Spacewalk Mission Set for 2008:
Official,” 24 February 2006, FBIS CPP20060224074023.
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Xinhua, People’s Daily Online, 7 March 2006, China's
Space Program Seeks New Breakthroughs in Five Years

Unmanned Lunar Probes
Chinese officials have repeatedly stated that
travel to the Moon is part of their space program.
While most of the discussion of near-term
missions has been about unmanned probes,
several public statements have pointed to manned
lunar missions in the future as well.
Following the first successful Shenzhou mission,
press reports were predicting lunar missions. In
2003, Qinghua University and the State Robot
Research Center were reportedly already working
on the manufacture of lunar landing
vehicles.14 Late that same year, Zhang Qingwei
was quoted by Xinhua as saying China was to
“launch its first Moon probing satellite in the next
three to five years.”15 In November 2004, Hu
Hao, described as “Director of the Lunar
Exploration Engineering Center,” presented an
outline of the lunar program in a conference. He
said the program was divided into three stages:
orbiting the Moon in 2007, an unmanned landing
on the Moon carrying a “Moon rover” by 2012,
and the use of lunar vehicles on the Moon to
collect samples of lunar soil from then to 2017.
(Other statements by space program officials
clarified that this third stage involved the return
of samples to Earth.16) Hu stated that the first
craft in China’s lunar exploration program, the
Chang’e-1 satellite, would be sent to orbit the
Moon in 2007 from the Xichang Satellite Launch
Center.17
As of 2005, this same three-stage program was
still being described as well as the steps
underway to bring it about.
The Lunar
Exploration Engineering Center was opened in
August in Beijing, with the opening ceremony
14

Shanghai Jiefang Ribao, “China’s Lunar Probe,
Aerospace Development Programs,” 17 October 2003,
FBIS CPP20031213000078.
15
Xinhua News Agency, 1 November 2003, China to
Launch Moon Probiing Satellite in 3 to 5 Years.
16
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presided over by Zhang Yunchuan, minister in
charge of the Commission of Science,
Technology and Industry for National Defense
(COSTIND), which has authority over the lunar
program.18
A spokesman for the China
Aerospace Science and Technology Group
(CAST) said in October that his company was
involved in the research and development for the
Chang’e-1 lunar probe.19 By January 2006,
COSTIND had listed the manned space program
and the lunar probe program as two of its five
major tasks for the 2006-2010 timeframe.20

a manned moon landing at a proper time, around
2017,” He further claimed that a goal of such
missions would be to report on the presence of
“Helium-3.”23 At about the same time, Hu
Shixiang was saying that he thought a Chinese
manned lunar landing would occur “in about 10
to 15 years.”24 The latest comment by Luan Enjie
of CNSA, in December 2005, sounded like a plea
for patience. “Sending a man to the Moon? It
would be a one-way ticket if we do it now, given
[that] the thrust of our rockets at present is not
strong enough.”25

Manned Lunar Missions

The Chinese Program: How Serious?

Several reasons have been
given by the Chinese for Will the
lunar missions, to include Chinese be
exploration and exploitation able to
of resources on the Moon, the
execute the
further
development
of
spaceflight technology, and plan in
prestige:
“stimulating anything
national spirit and cementing like the
national cohesion.”
An timelines
article in PLA Daily in April described?
2004 further stated that
“China will complete the
unmanned moon exploration in about 20 years
and then launch and fulfill a manned moon
landing.”21 Luan Enjie repeated in 2005 that the
lunar probe missions were designed to “provide
data for manned lunar missions and for choosing
a site for a lunar base.”22

To sum up, Chinese government and space
program officials have collectively described a
manned spaceflight program that includes space
walks by 2008, space docking attempts by 2011,
a space lab in orbit by perhaps 2012, a Chinese
space station in orbit by perhaps 2015, and a
manned mission to the Moon by around 2017.
There have been remarks on other programs – a
mission to Mars, Chinese “space tourist” launches
– but these seem far off, speculative, and not part
of a real program.

The timing of China’s planned mission to the
Moon remains vague.
Ouyang Ziyuan, an
academician of the China Academy of Sciences
and chief scientist of the Moon-probe program,
claimed in November 2005 that “China will make

Two questions arise about the declared elements
of the program as we understand it. First, does
this outline reflect the actual Chinese plan?
Second, is the plan real in the sense that the
Chinese will be able to execute it in anything like
the timeframes described?
An additional
question might be: how do we make reasonable
judgments on the first two questions?
In the first case, it may not be possible to know if
the outline above is the real plan until we have
access to the real plan. It is possible that the
23
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Chinese will update their White Paper and make
the program contents and timetable more explicit.
Short of that, a careful watch on future public
statements can give a sense of consistency or
fluidity in the declared program.
Major
fluctuations in timing or contents, as they appear
in future statements, may suggest that the public
plan and the real plan are quite distant from one
another. Of course, tracking actual spaceflight
activity will eventually tell us if these
declarations were made in good faith. It will
likely be a matter of some years before we can
compare this outline with actual progress. In the
near term, the launch of a lunar probe and the
accomplishment of a Shenzhou space walk by
2008, as declared, would argue that declarations
to date have been about the real plan.
In the second case, the question of whether this is
an executable plan, access to the technologies
being developed and knowledge of the resources
available and allocated to this plan could help
determine if they can achieve the stated goals.
The Chinese are more likely to be open about the
first of these. There is already a certain level of
openness in scientific journals’ coverage of
research for space programs in general. Since the
manned program carries such prestige, they are
likely to trumpet the achievements made in
technologies that contribute to this program. The
manned program is also more public and less
sensitive than some other space programs such as
reconnaissance, geopositioning, and military
communications satellites.

such sweeping statements, little detail is
available. We are left to guess whether Chinese
spending is sufficient to achieve stated goals in
the times given publicly.
Looking at the program in the larger sense, we
can see that the Chinese are at a point when the
technologies needed for manned spaceflight are
now available to them and they believe
achievements in manned space exploration are
within their grasp and important to national pride.
They are serious in that they have set goals for
themselves in space and are working toward
them. Manned space missions play a prominent
role in their plan. Their accomplishment of the
set goals of a Chang’e lunar probe and Shenzhou
space walk/space docking missions should tell us
whether they are serious enough to make the plan
happen.

Following the money is more challenging
because, as with their military budget, the
Chinese are anything but open and seem to
calculate expenditures in very different ways
from the West. There have been a few general
statements on space budgets for the manned
programs, such as the claim in 2004 that U.S.
$2.18 Billion had been spent on the manned space
program in the preceding 11 years.26 Beyond
26
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